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The Rushdie Incident as
Law-and-Literature Parable
Pinaki Chakravorty
Given relatively unsophisticated notions of "law" and "literature," Salman
Rushdie's incendiary novel, The Satanic Verses,' is "literature," and the
measures taken or attempted against it in Iran, India, and elsewhere,2 however
questionable, are "law" or interpretations of law. That there is interaction and
clash between "law" and "literature" in the Rushdie incident is therefore
obvious as a matter of common sense. That the Rushdie incident might have
parabolic significance in the context of existing law-and-literature scholarship3
is also, therefore, commonsensically valid. A parable is a story at once
particular and universal 4-a fact-intensive, narrative example (and possibly
even subversive counterexample5 ) that moves beyond its particular facts to
general maxims. By retelling the Rushdie incident within a law-and-literature
1. SALMAN RUSHDIE, THE SATANIC VERSES (1989).
2. For a description of The Satanic Verses and the reactions it evoked, see infra part 1.
3. For a survey of law-and-literature scholarship that continues to be useful despite its age, see Robert
Weisberg, The Law-Literature Enterprise, I YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1 (1988).
4. See MARY ANN ToLBERT, PERsPEcTIvEs ON THE PARABLES: AN APPROAct TO MULTIPLE
INTERPRErATIONS 35-40 (1979) (observing that structural logic of parable abstracts ordinary meaning of
story to more universal meaning, endowing particular instance with general explanatory capability). I am
indebted to Professor Robert Ferguson for directing my attention to the structural aspects of religious
parables. Letter from Robert Ferguson. Professor. Columbia University School of Law. to author (June 1.
1994) (on file with author).
5. See, e.g., WILLIAM HERZOG II, PARABLES AS SUBVERSIVE SPEECH: JESUS AS PEDAGOGUE OF THE
OPPRESSED (1994) (arguing that Jesus' parables were about real conditions of exploitation in Palestine);
see also Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative. 87 MICH. L
REV. 2411, 2413 (1989) ("Stories, parables, chronicles, and narratives are powerful means for destroying
mindset .... ).
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context,6 I will thus be telling a story about law and literature, in the tradition
of legal storytelling begun by the law-and-literature movement itself.7 My
story, in turn, will demonstrate how capacities for reading and telling stories
can be similar, and yet very different, within law and literature.
This Note presents the media incident surrounding Rushdie's publication
of The Satanic Verses as a parable for the coexisting proximity and distance
between literature and law. Part I factually situates the parable by summarizing
the legal action within the incident and the novel that instigated it. Part II
suggests that the Rushdie incident speaks authoritatively about law and
literature because it can itself be understood as a complex literary narrative
constrained by its own uncomfortably trial-like, bipolar medium.
Having established a parabolic strategy of reading, this Note goes on to
read the Rushdie incident for its lessons about the law-literature boundary.
First (as discussed in Part III), the incident demonstrates that legal
pronouncement, when based on the reading of a literary narrative, may do
violence and injustice to literary meaning. The editing and reordering of
evidence necessary to achieve any legal pronouncement means, when the
"evidence" is literary, that reading in the literary sense must be compromised
or authoritatively simplified into trial-like side taking. Second (as discussed in
Part IV), the Rushdie incident implicates an author who had previously aspired
to make his fiction a quasi-legal instrument of political and social change, but
who, upon success, insists that politically opinionated fiction should not be the
same as politically motivated action for purposes of legal condemnation. The
visible material effects of The Satanic Verses make Rushdie's assertion of
literature's quasi-legal power believable; yet equally believable are his later
caveats about fiction's limitations as lawmaker. Finally, the incident pinpoints
a further discrepancy between law and literature (discussed in Part V) by
underscoring the different conceptions of authorial intention assumed by a
"multivoiced" literary novel and by the "univocal" legal society that condemns
it. It nonetheless remains difficult to draw a lesson of law-literature
discrepancy from the Rushdie incident, since "pluralist" championing of
novelistic multivoicedness within a multicultural state appears to reconcile law
and literature, albeit with some limitations. Furthermore, "fundamentalist"
6. The Spring 1990 issue of The Cardozo Studies in Law and Literature prefaced its reprinting of
several writers' and artists' responses to thefatwa by declaring:
For students of Law and Literature, the essays, articles, speeches, protests and calls for action
over [The Satanic Verses] are immensely instructive. They provide an encyclopedic review of
the power of literature within a society and the way in which legal systems establish or limit
the zone in which literature can function.
The Power of Images: Reflections on Salman Rushdie, 2 CARDOZO STUD. L. & LITERATuRB 67, 68 (1990).
For a definition and description of thefatwa, see infra part I.A.
The individual responses reprinted in The Cardozo Studies in Law and Literature issue were taken
from a compilation of public reactions to and media coverage of the Rushdie incident. See TIB RUSHDIE
FILE (Lisa Appignanesi & Sara Maitland eds., 1990).
7. See infra note 96 and accompanying text.
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censure of Rushdie's novel can be understood in its own terms as a differing
literary sensibility.
The Rushdie incident thus argues both for and against the law-literature
relationship, its categorical stationings of law and literature being indistinct,
nuanced, erratically convergent and divergent. At once example and
troublesome counterexample, the incident comes to stand for a certain paradox,
factually retold, at the heart of law-and-literature scholarship. Whether it relates
to such scholarship in a paradigmatic or parasitic fashion is therefore
predictably undecidable.
I. "DIE HE OR JUSTICE MUST":8 A BRIEF PARSING OF
THE RUSHDIE INCIDENT
A. Legal Responses to The Satanic Verses
When Rushdie wrote The Satanic Verses, he was not a stranger to the
"business end" of his frequently offended readership. His dangerous roman 6
clef career, beginning with Midnight's Children, had already earned him a
lawsuit in the High Court of London from then Prime Minister of India Indira
Gandhi, for one of that book's many thinly veiled and insulting references to
Gandhi and her family.9 Rushdie's next book (Shame), flippantly fictionalizing
more than one generation of Pakistani politicians, had angered those among
them who were still alive.'0 When The Satanic Verses was published in
September 1988, Rushdie "expected that the mullahs wouldn't like it.""
The profusion of legal activity against the book in the few months after its
publication was nevertheless surprising. General protest without the color of
law ubiquitously legitimated legal interposition, if not the exact legal action
taken.' 2 On October 5, 1988, the Indian Finance Ministry announced a ban
on the novel, adding that the ban did not detract from the novel's literary and
artistic merit.'3 Other countries, including Bangladesh, Pakistan, South Africa,
8. JOHN MILTON, PARADISE LOST bk. 3, I. 210 (1674). reprinted in THE POEMtS OP iown MILTos 457.
573 (John Carey & Alastair Fowler eds., 1968).
9. See DANIEL PIPES, THE RUSHDIE AFFAIR: THE NovEL, THE AYATOL.AH. AND THE WEST 47 (1990);
W.J. WEATHERBY, SALMAN RUSHDIE: SENTENCED TO DEATH 50-51 (1990).
10. See PIPES, supra note 9. at 47-48.
11. Bandung File: Interview with Salman Rushdie (Channel 4 (London) television broadcast. Feb. 14.
1989), in THE RUSHDIE FILE, supra note 6, at 21. The term mullah refers to a Muslim clerical and legal
authority.
12. Many Muslims offended by The Satanic Verses were nevertheless opposed to Khomeini's farwa.
See, e.g., Dr. Ali A. Mazrui, The Moral Dilemma of Salman Rushdie's Satanic Verses. Lecture Delivered
at Comell University (Mar. 1, 1989), in THE RUSHDIE FILE, supra note 6. at 202, 210 ("But the Ayatollah
is still wrong in the death sentence."); Harvey Morris et al.. Khomeini Orders Rushdie'* M.urder.
INDEPENDENT (London), Feb. 15, 1989, at l ("'We very much regret and denounce Khomeini's statement.'-
(quoting Hesham EI-Essawi of Islamic Society for the Promotion of Religious Tolerance in the U.K.)).
13. See Carmel Bedford, Foreword to Fiction, Fact and the Fatwa. in THE RUSHDIE LETTERS:
FREEDOM To SPEAK, FREEDOM To WRITE 127 (Steve MacDonogh & Article 19 eds.. 1993) (hereinafter
THE RUSHDIE LETTERS]; see also Salman Rushdie, An Open Letter to the Indian Prime Minister (Oct. 7.
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Sri Lanka, and Sudan followed the Indian government by instituting their own
bans.'4 In December, the Islamic Defence Council in London held a protest
rally, and on January 14, 1989, Muslims in Bradford, Yorkshire, burned a copy
of The Satanic Verses in public. 15 On February 12, 1989, approximately 2000
protesters stormed the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad, attacking police with stones
and bricks; five protesters were killed when police opened fire on them. 6
On February 14, 1989, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini of Iran pronounced
a fatwa (religious sentence) 7 on Teheran radio, sentencing to death Rushdie
and all involved in the publication of his book "who were aware of its
content," and promising heaven and martyrdom to all who would die in
implementing the sentence. 18 The text of the fatwa, though clearly expressing
a sentence against blasphemy or apostasy,' 9 is noticeably unspecific about
exactly how the book breaches law and therefore gets some of its legal force
contextually, from the months of more specific public protest preceding it.
As a legal pronouncement against literature, thefatwa must have begun in
some kind of "reading" or "interpretation" of literature, but hermeneutic
faculties are subordinated in the final pronouncement to judgment. Despite its
religious veneer and its arguably questionable interpretation of Islamic law,2
it is as much a legal proclamation as a religious one. Indeed, the categories of
law and religion conflate in Islamic law, as this excerpt from Khomeini's
elaborate post-fatwa message of February 23, 1989, shows:
Salutations to those who rushed forward to discover the inner
meaning of jurisprudence, and became sentinels to their nation and
community ....
1988) [hereinafter Rushdie, An Open Letter], reprinted in THE RUSHDIE FILE, supra note 6, at 34
(responding to novel's banning); Syed Shahabuddin, "You Did This With Satanic Forethought, Mr
Rushdie", TIMES OF INDIA, Oct. 13, 1988, reprinted in THE RUSHDIE FILE, supra note 6, at 37, 40 (listing
other Indian laws that could have been used against the book).
14. See Bedford, supra note 13, at 128-29; M.M. Slaughter, The Salman Rushdie Affair: Apostasy,
Honor and Freedom of Speech, 79 VA. L. REV. 153, 156 (1993).
15. See Bedford, supra note 13, at 128-29.
16. Id. at 129.
17. For a more precise definition of the term fatwa, see Slaughter, supra note 14, at 175 (defining
fatwas as "formal legal opinions in the nature of advisory opinions as to what is lawful under Islamic law").
18. See PIPES, supra note 9, at 27, 87; Carmel Bedford, Fiction, Fact and the Fatwa, in THE RUSHDIE
LETERS, supra note 13, at 130. For reporting of thefatwa in London, see Robin Lustig et al., War of the
Word, OBSERVER (London), Feb. 19, 1989, at 19, reprinted in THE RUSHDIE FILE, supra note 6, at 68.
19. It is helpful to remember that blasphemy and treason are nearly indistinguishable in Islamic law.
See Ali A. Mazrui, "Satanic Verses" or a Satanic Novel?, in THE KISS OF JUDAS: AFFAIRS OF A BROWN
SAHIB 61, 62-65 (Munawar A. Anees ed., 1989) [hereinafter THE KISS OF JUDAS].
20. See PIPES, supra note 9, at 87-95; MALISE RuTrvEN, A SATANIC AFFAIR: SALMAN RUSHDIE AND
THE RAGE OF ISLAM 112-13 (1990); Sadik J. AI-Azm, Is the Fatwa a Fatwa?, in FOR RUSHDIE: ESSAYS
BY ARAB AND MUSLM WRIERs IN DEFENSE OF FREE SPEECH 21 (Kevin Anderson & Kenneth Whitehead
trans., George Braziller 1994) (1993); Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Islam and the State, 12 CARDOZO L. REV.
1015, 1051-52 (1991); Slaughter, supra note 14, at 175-77. But cf SHABBIR AKIHTAR, BE CAREFUL WITH
MuHAMMAD! THE SALMAN RUSHDIE AFFAIR 77-78 (1989) (defendingfatwa's legitimate basis in Islamic
law).
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For hundreds of years... Itihe oppressed people have always
drunk their fill from the pure fountain of the gnosis of illustrious
jurisconsults....
... The Satanic Verses is ... a calculated move aimed at rooting
out religion and religiousness, aimed above all at Islam and its
clergy .... [I]f the World Devourers could, they would have burnt out
the roots and title of the clergy.2'
To use Robert Cover's terms, thefanva, like other measures taken against the
novel, summons "imperial" force to create "normative meaning" (specifically,
that the book is offensive and cannot be countenanced); in this, it is vitally
legal. 2-
Legal activism against The Satanic Verses did not stop with the fatva.
British Muslims later sued Rushdie and his publisher in English court under
common law charges of blasphemy and sedition.23 In the case against
Rushdie, the Queen's Bench Division of the High Court affirmed a denial of
seditious libel and blasphemous libel charges, on the basis that the common
law offense of blasphemous libel applied only to attacks on the Christian
religion.2'
Perhaps other legal measures could have been marshaled that were not. In
a plea to British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, Dr. Syed Pasha of the
Union of Muslim Organisations in Britain asked (unsuccessfully) for
prosecution of Rushdie and his publisher under the British Public Order
Act?. 5 In a public letter, Indian Member of Parliament (MP) Syed
Shahabuddin threatened Rushdie with several Indian Penal Code provisions
that could have been used against him, had Rushdie only been living in India.
26
21. A Challenge to the World Devourers. GUARDIAN (London). Mar. 6. 1989. at 21 (transcript of
Teheran radio address); cf Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Law and Religion in the Muslim Middle East. 35 Am.
J. COMP. L. 127, 157-60 (1987) (outlining Khomeini's Islamic legal theories and their impact on Iranian
Constitution). For a discussion of the Islamic law of apostasy. see Sami A. Aldecb Abu-Sahleh. LDbert
Religieuse er Apostasie dans l'Jslam [Religious Freedom and Apostasy in Islam). 3 PRAXIS JURIDIQUE El
RELIGION 43 (1986). For a general survey of Islamic law, see JOSEPH SCHACIT. AN INTRODUCTION TO
IsLAMuc LAW (1964).
22. See Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court. 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97
HARV. L. REv. 4, 12-13 (1983).
23. See The Satanic Verses in the High Court, NEW HUMANtST, May 1990. at 12, 12-13; Slaughter,
supra note 14, at 158, 184 n.173.
24. See Anne Bayefsky & Joan Fitzpatrick, International Human Rights Law in United States Courts:
A Comparative Perspective, 14 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1, 58-59 (1992) (discussing disposition of The Queen
v. Chief Magistrate, exparte Choudhury, (1991] 1 All E.R. 306 (Q.B. 1990)). The court refused to entertain
suggestions that such construction of the common law would discriminate on the basis of religion in
violation of Articles 9 and 14 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms. Id. For the relevant text of these articles, see Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, arts. 9, 14. 213 U.N.T.S. 221. 230-33.
25. Amit Roy & Deirdre Fernand, SUNDAY TIMES (London), Feb. 19, 1989. at AI5, Al6. For relevant
text of the British Public Order Act, see Slaughter, supra note 14. at 158 n.22.
26. See Shahabuddin, supra note 13, at 40. For counterresponses to the legal reaction against The
Satanic Verses, see William Vogeler, What Are Legal Ramifications of Rushdie Furor?. L.A. DAILY J.,
Mar. 10, 1989, at 1.
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However overbearing and authoritarian, all legal response against The
Satanic Verses actually relates to the literary text as both master and slave.
Judgment is subservient to the extent that it must ground itself in the novel,
though judgmental "reading," even in good faith, characteristically crosses into
forcible misreading.
B. The Novel and How It Offends
The Satanic Verses is a precarious collection of overdetermined stories so
uncontainable that they overflow into one another; in uncanny ways they even
overflow into and circumscribe the terms of the ensuing incident. The central
narrative begins with two men-Gibreel Farishta, dream-tormented
schizophrenic 27 and sometime anxious religionist turned disbeliever, 28 a
larger-than-life cinema idol from the excruciatingly melodramatic "theological"
genre of Hindi films; 29 and Saladin Chamcha,3° a British-educated Indian
living in England, called the "Man of a Thousand Voices and a Voice" by
virtue of his television and radio advertising background, 3' and therefore,
importantly, also an actor. "[A]ctors are not people,' 32 muses Chamcha at the
beginning of the novel, foreboding Farishta's metamorphosis into an angel and
Chamcha's own transformation into fiend, complete with bestial horns and
hooves. Bedeviled by his own appearance, Chamcha is taken by the English
police for an illegal immigrant, beaten and manhandled, ending up in a hospital
with other migrants, themselves transformed into mythical creatures.33 The
full implications of this devil-angel dichotomy are complex, and Rushdie's
prose often requires an intimate familiarity with the innards of subcontinental
culture and the rhythms of subcontinental speech. Nevertheless, Chamcha is
being "punished" for his migrant status, for his betrayal of the authenticity and
traditionalism essential to a false sense of continuity with the past, whereas
.Farishta is being rewarded for his ineptly formulaic embrace of this same rootedness.Y
27. RUSHDIE, THE SATANIC VERSES, supra note 1, at 83; see also SALMAN RUSHDIE, In Good Faith,
in IMAGINARY HOMELANDS 393, 398 (1991) ("His greatest torments... [are] in the form of dreams.").
28. See RUSHDIE, THE SATANIC VERSES, supra note 1, at 21-22 ("He grew up believing in God,
angels, demons, afreets, djinns, as matter-of-factly as if they were bullock-carts or lamp-posts ....
Sometimes, though, he caught himself in the act of forming blasphemous thoughts .... "); id. at 29 ("[lit
became clear that he had ... lost his faith.").
29. See id. at 24-29.
30. The name is shortened from "Salahuddin" to rhyme with "Aladdin," whose story reverberates
through Saladin's in significant ways.
31. RUSHDIE, THE SATANIC VERSES, supra note 1, at 60-63.
32. Id. at 34 ("[Lies acteurs ne sont pas des gens.").
33. Id. at 141-42, 157-62, 167-71.
34. See id. at 426-27. Immediately after admitting to this intention, the narrator undercuts it. Id. at 427
("Mhis sounds, does it not, dangerously like an intentionalist fallacy?"). In fact, very few conclusions can
be reached about the book that the book itself has not already anticipated and complicated. The interpreter
handling the bait can never be sure whether she is fish or fisherman. If the Chamcha-Farishta story were
reducible to punishment and reward, it would essentially be a tragedy on migration and colonialism. But
it is not so reducible. Rushdie himself commented that the writing of The Satanic Verses thwarted any ideas
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Notwithstanding the profanity that is scattered throughout the book and
often directed at figures sacred to Islam (e.g., "bastard" for Abraham and
"fucking clowns" for the Companions of the Prophet35), the other narratives
account for most of the offense taken.36 The story of "Mahound," as dreamed
by Farishta, is imaginatively reconstructed from historical accounts of
Muhammad and the beginning of Islam in Mecca. The choice of "Mahound"
for the Prophet's name, as an adoption of the derisive European version of
Muhammad, is offensive in itself, though the text complicates this
characterization by adding disclaimers that the naming is strategic: "To turn
insults into strengths, whigs, tories, Blacks all chose to wear with pride the
names they were given in scorn ....
Rushdie's treatment of the "satanic verses" also offended. Briefly, the
satanic verses episode,38 as told by the tenth-century historian Tabari, refers
to Muhammad's acceptance, under Satanic deception, of three female deities
from the prevailing polytheistic religion in Mecca-an acceptance later
recanted when the Archangel Gibreel advises Muhammad of Satan's trickery.
Most Muslim scholars regard the Qur'an39 in its entirety as the word of God
dictated to Muhammad by the Archangel, and the compromising satanic verses
as apocryphal, even as a convenient tool for "orientalist" revision of Islamic
history.' Rushdie's primary offense is that he invoked these verses at all."'
he had had of a "devil-angel relationship [that] would be straightforward." Sean French, Talks to Salman
Rushdie, OBSERVER (London), Sept. 25, 1988. at 43. reprinted in THE RUSHDIE FILE. supra note 6. at 6.
7; cf. RUSHDIE, THE SATANIC VERSES. supra note I, at 424 ("What follows is tragedy.-Or. at least the
echo of tragedy, the full-blooded original being unavailable to modern men and women .. "). But cf.
Stephen A. Landsman, Satanic Cases: A Means of Confronting the Laws Immorality, 66 NOTRE DA.%tE L
REV. 785, 790 (1991) (arguing that, because The Satanic Verses portrays characters "in posiuons not unlike
the ones young lawyers are likely to face," novel has didactic moral value for lawyers confronting
"temptation" and "moral risk").
35. See Slaughter, supra note 14. at 168 (quoting Rushdie and citing Muslim cnticsms of these
characterizations).
36. Portions of my description of the book's offensive sections have been substantially adapted from
the archival work of others. See PIPES, supra note 9. at 53-69; Slaughter. supra note 14. at 161-69.
37. RUSHDIE, THE SATANIC VERSES, supra note 1. at 93; cf. RUSHDIE. In Good Faith. supra note 27.
at 402 (pointing to "Mahound" controversy as "instance in which de-contextualization has created a
complete reversal of meaning").
38. See generally F.E. PETERS, MUHAIMAD AND THE ORIGINS OF ISLAMI 160-62 (1994) (apparently
accepting incident as historically truthful). For accessible introductions to Islamic history and thought, see
CAESAR E. FARAH, IsLAM: BELIEFS AND OBSERVANCES (1968): MORAM.AD T. MEHDI. ISLAMt AND
INTOLERANCE: REPLY TO SALMAN RUSHDIE 14-31 (1989).
39. The Qur'an (anglicized Koran) is the sacred text of Islam.
40. See, e.g., MUTAHARUNNISA OMER, THE HOLY PROPHET AND THE SATANIC SLANDER 89-90.
101-06 (1989); M.M. Ahsan, The "Satanic" Verses and the Orientalists. HAMDARD lSLAt cus. Spring
1982, at 27 (1982), reprinted in SACRILEGE VERSUS CIVILITY: MUSLIMi PERSPECTIVES ON THE SATANIC
VERSES AFFAIR 131 (M.M. Ahsan & A.R. Kidwai eds., rev. ed. 1993) (hereinafter SACRILEGE). The word
"orientalist," meaning a student of oriental culture, connotatively describes one who recreates the "orient"
(e.g., as "backward" or "exotic") for Western imperialist fancy. See generally EDwARD W. SAID.
ORiENTAtUSM (1978).
41. A recurring trend in Muslim writing critical of Rushdie is a characterization of him as Anglophile
and orientalist "wanna-be." Ausaf Ali, The Westernization of a Nice Muslim Boy. UNIVERSAL MESSAGE,
Mar. 1991, at 25; Shahabuddin, supra note 13, at 39 ("Rushdie... has to brag... so that he can
convincingly vend his Islam wares in the West .... "); see also "Simon Rushton" aka Salman Rushdie,
The Yale Law Journal
But The Satanic Verses reimagines Tabari's account with other, overtly
blasphemous interpretations. First, it is unclear whether Gibreel is in control
of Mahound or vice versa;42 second, it is clear that Gibreel/Mahound, not
Satan, are responsible for "both the statement and the repudiation" of the
satanic verses; and third, it is suggested that Mahound later invents the diabolic
origins of the satanic verses to mask the truth.43
In the story of "Ayesha,"' the novel continues a general preoccupation
with overpowering femininity that is ultimately traceable to the central conflict
between Allah and the three female deities from the satanic verses. Ayesha, a
young prophetess (and namesake for Muhammad's/Mahound's favorite wife),
is inspired by the Archangel Gibreel to lead her followers into the Arabian
Sea, which will miraculously part and convey them to Mecca. The story
borrows from an actual incident in Karachi in the early 1980's, when several
pilgrims willingly drowned themselves behind a Shiite woman promising to
lead them to the holy city of Kerbala in Iraq. Associating a figure of popular
superstition with the Prophet's favorite wife means, to Muslim readers,
profaning Ayesha's name.45 Some also inferred a sly aspersion on Islam, and
religion generally, as derivative of and culminating in fanaticism.46
The brothel episode dreamed by Farishta47 is perhaps the most potently
offensive. Prostitutes in a brothel in Jahilia (the fictional equivalent of Mecca)
improve their business when they take on the names and manner of the
Prophet's twelve wives. They are eventually executed for their actions, but the
damage, from the point of view of Muslim readers, has undeniably been done.
Condemning Rushdie for The Satanic Verses requires deciding whether or
not fiction is a factitious cover for malicious diatribe. The answer is far from
easy, but no straightforward diatribe could have offended more easily. The
Satanic Verses is everywhere alive to its own meaning, profaning with
in SACRILEGE, supra note 40, at 65, 67 ("Mis detractors anglicise his name to Simon Rushton."). But see
TIMoTHY BRENNAN, SALMAN RUSHDIE AND THE THIRD WoRLD: MYTHS OF THE NATION 32-78 (1989)
(situating Rushdie as anticolonial and postcolonial writer); Salman Rushdie, Choice Between Light and
Dark, OBSERVER (London), Jan. 22, 1989, at 11, reprinted in THE RUSHDIE FILE, supra note 6, at 61, 62
("Mhe saddest irony of all ... [is] that after working ... to give voice and fictional flesh to the immigrant
culture of which I am myself a member, I should see my book burned, largely unread, by the people it's
about .. "). But cf. Feroza Jussawalla, Resurrecting the Prophet. The Case of Salman, the Otherwise, 2
PUB. CULTURE 106, 111 (1989) ("Thus, we see the failure of paradigmatic approaches: the anti-Orientalist
has turned into an Orientalist!"); Alex Knonagel, The Satanic Verses: Narrative Structure and Islamic
Doctrine, 18 INT'L FICTION REV. 69, 73 (1991) ("While the novel manages to arouse the reader's anger
against oppression, it undermines this anger at the same time by ridiculing its victims."); Ali A. Mazrul,
Witness for the Prosecution: A Cross-Examination on The Satanic Verses, THIRD TEXT, Summer 1990, at
31, 33 ("(lIt is not unusual for a person to be anti-imperialist in a general sense and yet a racist at the same
time.").
42. RUSHDIE, THE SATANIC VERSES, supra note 1, at 110, 112, 122.
43. IL at 123-25.
44. Id at 216-40, 473-507.
45. See Slaughter, supra note 14, at 169-70.
46. Id.; see also AKHTAR, supra note 20, at 29.
47. RUSHDIE, THE SATANIC VERSES, supra note 1, at 380-92.
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ambiguous purpose but with full mindfulness. It only injures so well because
it assaults so knowingly.
IX. WHY THE RUSHDIE INCIDENT HAS ANYTHING To SAY ABOUT
LAW AND LITERATURE
Empowered and sustained by the media, the Rushdie incident is a media
production.48 Because it so palpably regards legal reception of literature, it
must have some commonsensical relevance to the law-and-literature movement.
Furthermore, partly because it is a media production, the incident itself is at
once like literature and like law (or "trial").
The manner in which the media has presented and debated the Rushdie
incident is trial-like. Trials, one can say without overreaching, often serve
cultural purposes, cathartic or otherwise.49 Publicized trials may have an
element of the theatrical, dramatizing adversaries to ascribe mythic or symbolic
values to events. In such large-scale productions of cultural meaning through
legal process, the media's participation as medium is understandably thick.
To be sure, media intervention, no matter how trying for people and ideas
in the public eye, does not automatically amount to a legal trial. The Rushdie
incident itself is not a grand confrontation between free expression and
fundamentalism in some officially capable and international legal forum-even
if it is undoubtedly peppered with isolated applications of legalistic rhetoric."
The apparent inability of pluralism and fundamentalism to meet on common
legal ground has to do with jurisdictional and political feasibilities in
contemporary international order. To the extent that this failure to universalize
law is a function of discursive disparities between "East" and "West," it has
similarities with what Sara Suleri identifies as the "essential alegality" and
"radical obsolescence [of law]" in colonial discourse, i.e., with the failure of
colonial regimes to legitimize themselves in the legal precedent of either
Western colonizer or Oriental colonized.5'
48. Indeed, the fatwa itself derives its particular ability to sentence from media dissemination. I use
the present and present perfect tenses to describe the Rushdie incident in the belief that. for both Rushdie
and his punishers, the incident remains almost as relevant in the present as it was six years ago. Cf. Henry
L. Gates, Jr., The Empire Writes Back. Worlds Collide in Salman Rushdie's New Collection, NEW YORKER,
Jan. 23, 1995, at 91, 92 ("If Rushdie's persecutors have made the experience of rootless nomadism all too
literal for him, he's still teaching the rest of us why we can't go home again.").
49. I am indebted to Professor Robert Ferguson for this observation. Interview with Robert Ferguson.
Professor, Columbia University School of Law, in New Haven, Conn. (May 4. 1994).
50. For uses of the "trial" metaphor within the Rushdie incident. see Maui,. supra note 41. at 31;
Stephanie Newell, The Other God. Salman Rushdie's "New" Aesthetic. I LERxtATuRE & HtsT. 67. 73
(1992) ("The trial-by-fiction of Koran undertaken by Rushdie has Westem Orientalism at its roots ....-).
51. SARA SULER, THE RHETORIC OF ENGLISH INDIA 55-56 (1992). Suleri finds, upon reading the trial
of Warren Hastings, that Hastings' accusers were rhetorically compelled to differentiate their own legal
authority from Hastings' pernicious use of colonial power to ill effect; else the colonial enterprise itself
would have been inculpated in Hastings' apparent irrationality. The source of their anxiety was that siding
against Hastings also meant siding against their own rational legal order. It seems reasonable to wonder
whether Suleri's reading might apply to other jurisprudence that answers historical examples of prejudiced
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But in another sense, if Rushdie and his adversaries are not actually on
trial in the Rushdie incident, they nevertheless might as well be. Like a trial,
the Rushdie incident pares down individuals and ideas with internally complex,
ambiguous life stories to produce wieldy but simplistic plaintiff-defendant
oppositions.52 Like a trial, it appears to be a cultural mechanism that replaces
and cheats complex cognition with facile, authoritative differentiation. Still, the
Rushdie incident is a trial-by-media; judgment within it is effectively dissipated
through scattered, nonauthoritative texts. But the dichotomous categories
necessary for quick (perhaps unjust) judgment nonetheless control meaning and
derive authority in aftereffect. Adversarial antagonism between fundamentalist
condemnation and pluralist protection of free speech remains a prominent
interpretive key to the incident. Yet, not only are there differences within
Islamic law, 53 and not only is Khomeini's interpretation contestable within
Islamic law itself,54 but the tradition of heretical literature within Islam (and
public tolerance of it) dates back at least to the ninth century.55 Nor is The
Satanic Verses collapsible into a version of antireligious free speech, because
Rushdie's intention from the beginning has apparently been just the opposite:
to get inside what it means to have religious experience, instead of providing
an easy "secular sneer.,
56
adjudication by rigorously privileging universally applicable neutral principles over the kind of openly
ideological articulation of law that could theoretically both legitimate and counteract existing inequities.
See id, at 53 ("The lie of the impeachment proceedings is thus its failure to admit that Hastings' misdeeds
were merely synecdochical of the colonial operation, that to assume that such governorship could take more
palatable form was to allow Burke to have his cake of astonishment and to eat it, too."); cf. Samuel P.
Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations?, FOREIGN AFF., Summer 1993, at 22, 40-41 (discussing
fundamental difference between contemporary Western and Eastern cultural ideals and noting that ideal of
"universal civilization" may itself be Western). But cf Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Universal Versus Islamic
Human Rights: A Clash of Cultures or a Clash with a Construct?, 15 MICH. J. INT'L L. 307, 309-20, 341
(1994) (disagreeing with Huntington's claims about Islamic culture).
52. Cf. JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW 4 (1976) ("The paradigm of law
is trial before a court. For almost a century the chief business of American lawyers has been elsewhere.");
id. at 113 (suggesting that absence of personal details may give legal recitation of facts "timeless quality").
53. See Moncef Marzouki, Au Nom d'Allah? (In the Name of Allah?], LE MONDE (Paris), Feb. 25,
1989, at 2, reprinted and translated in THE RUSHDIE FILE, supra note 6, at 131 ("Khomeini represents only
a fraction of the whole, Shi'ism, and only one group in this fraction, the clericalism of the extreme right.").
Even the "fundamentalist" label may not apply perfectly to some of the prominent fundamentalists in the
Rushdie incident. See RUTHVEN, supra note 20, at 123 (discussing Shabbir Akhtar). In this Note, the word
"fundamentalist" is not meant pejoratively.
54. See, e.g., AI-Azm, supra note 20; Mayer, supra note 20.
55. See Saadi A. Simawe, Rushdie's The Satanic Verses and Heretical Literature in Islam, 20 IOWA
REv. 185, 186 (1990); cf. RUSHDIE, In Good Faith, supra note 27, at 409 ("Islam contains the doubts of
Iqbal, Ghazali, Khayydm as well as the narrow certainties of Shabbir Akhtar of the Bradford Council of
Mosques .... ").
56. See PIPES, supra note 9, at 55; SALMAN RUSHDIE, "In God We Trust", in IMAGINARY
HOMELANDS, supra note 27, at 376, 376 ("Tqhe rationalism of... [literary realism] comes to seem like a
judgment upon ... the religious faith of the characters being described."); French, supra note 34, at 43,
reprinted in THE RUSHDIE FIL, supra note 6, at 7 ("'I don't believe that angels appear and talk to people.
On the other hand, revelation seems to me to be genuine."' (quoting Rushdie)); cf. Slaughter, supra note
14, at 201 (noting "irony" in similarity between Rushdie's project as writer and Muslim resistance to
liberalism); Sara Suleri, Contraband Histories: Salman Rushdie and the Embodiment of Blasphemy, 78
YALE REV. 604, 606-07 (1989) (finding that, in reinstalling sacred and profane as relevant categories,
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The sense of "trial" that follows from a commonsensical, perhaps
liberal, 7 idea of "law" implicates a ritualistic, case-by-case legal process,
where opposing sides are allowed to present their stories under formal
constraint. This sense of trial fails to describe the Rushdie incident, for in legal
pronouncements against the novel, neither Rushdie nor his detractors have
been given a meaningful equivalent of prejudgment due process." Where a
trial imports an expected constraint and rhythm,59 the Rushdie incident is
disruptive precisely because the international impact of Iranian legal
interpretation has been so unconstrained and unexpected.
On the other hand, a trial has a wholeness that allows it to contain
differing narratives under one organizing principle. The same has been said
about "law," and could be said about the manner in which the Rushdie incident
contains its component narratives:
[T]he whole of law is the production of one narrative after
another.... [E]ach individual focus ... will have unique features
that set it apart. Nevertheless, the unity of law as a discursive
enterprise will be the primary element of narrative and will lie at the
center of arguments over the point of law.60
Structurally, containment implies misrepresentation of the individual
components in the composite final product, and in the Rushdie incident, the
media is the visibly responsible culprit for any disparities between popular
perceptions and literary or legal realities. Misrepresentation may not mean
complete falsification and need not call for paranoic resistance to the media. 6'
Rather, misrepresentation by the media means mythification of historical truth
into cultural meaning.62 When "mediated," the primary legal and literary texts
within the incident emerge as more distinct and one-sided than close reading
or historical explanation reveals. Rushdie himself has banally participated in
Rushdie has written "a deeply Islamic book," and that Rushdie's blasphemy should be -reread as a gesture
of reconciliation toward the idea of belief").
57. According to Bruce Ackerman. constrained dialogue (of the sort trials replicate) ts (or should be)
the defining principle for the "liberal" way of organizing conflict. See generally BRUCE A. ACKER.MAN.
SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1980). The adversarial model does not account for criminal
procedure that is based on an inquisitorial system.
58. Cf. E.L. Doctorow, Statement at Public Meeting (Feb. 22- 1989). m TIE RUSHDIE Fit.E, supra note
6, at 159 (noticing that death sentence is "without trial").
59. Interview with Robert Ferguson, supra note 49.
60. Dennis M. Patterson, Law's Pragmatism: Law as Pracice & Narrative. 76 VA. L REv. 937, 989
(1990) (using proposition to argue that legal rules receive meaning from being embedded in tradition of
legal practice, and that change in law comes from within this practice).
61. See, e.g., DOUGLAS RUSHKOFF, MEDIA VIRUS! HIDDEN AGENDAS IN POPULAR CULTURE 41-42
(1994) (noting suggestion that Rushdie's agent had sent copy of The Satanic Verses to Khomeini with hope
of thereby increasing sales).
62. See Kendall Thomas, Strange Fruit, in RACE-tNG JUSTICE. EN-GENDERING POWER: ESSAYS O,
ANITA HILL, CLARENCE THOMAS, AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY 364. 364-65 (Toni
Morrison ed., 1992) (quoting Roland Barthes).
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this simplistic typology, becoming in turn the secular free-speech advocate63
and the devout convert to Islam.64 Both of these self-contained postures seem
utterly inadequate compared to the novel's redoubling ironies, its dexterous
avoidance and complication of every possible stance or meaning that might be
ascribed to it.65 In keeping with Charles Baudelaire's conception of irony,66
the novel refuses any kind of dialectical progression from naive to well-
considered positions, laughing at fool and philosopher alike as a way of
asserting the inauthenticity of both without sanctioning any particular
alternatives. When Rushdie's novel taunts, jeers, or laughs, it does not laugh
from a position of greater wisdom; rather, it questions the very possibility of
wisdom. The subsequent media version of "Rushdie," in a mockery of justice
to his own novel, simply alternates between more or less laughable roles.
As a consequence, sides are taken very easily in the Rushdie incident, even
where neither side was neatly one-sided ex ante. Sara Suleri writes that "[t]he
internal dangers of [The Satanic Verses] are ... externalized, or rendered unto
Iran." 67 No doubt the "internal dangers" of the Islamic side are also
externalized within the incident into an opposing "free speech" camp. Thus, if
Barbara Johnson is right to say that characteristic of legal judgment is the
forcible transformation of internal ambiguity (or "differences within") into
more adjudicable "differences between,"68 and if the function of "trial" is to
63. Rushdie, An Open Letter, supra note 13, at 34-35 ("These persons, whom I do not hesitate to call
extremists, even fundamentalists, have ... [stated] that they had no need actually to read [the book]....
The right to freedom of expression is at the very foundation of any democratic society .... "). One Muslim
respondent implored Rushdie not to be led by his fellow writers, for whom "'freedom of expression has
become a fetish."' John Ezard, Rushdie Urged To Withdraw Book and "End Suffering", GUARDIAN
(London), Mar. 7, 1989, at 2, reprinted in THE RUSHDIE FILE, supra note 6, at 124, 125 (quoting Hesham
El-Essawy of Islamic Society for Religious Tolerance in the U.K.). But cf. RUSHDIE, In Good Faith, supra
note 27, at 396 ("I have never seen this controversy as a struggle between Western freedoms and Eastern
unfreedom.").
64. SALMAN RUSHDIE, Why I Have Embraced Islam, in IMAGINARY HOMELANDS, supra note 27, at
430. Rushdie has since reverted back to a less conciliatory position. See Salman Rushdie, One Thousand
Days in a Balloon, in THE RUSHDIE LETrERs, supra note 13, at 13, 23 (describing failure of reconciliation
attempt with six Islamic scholars).
65. Cf. Homi Bhabha, NEW STATESMAN (London), Mar. 3, 1989, reprinted in THE RUSHDIB FILE,
supra note 6, at 112, 113 ("The complex vision of Satanic Verses is fast losing its reality ... [and] being
reduced to empty symbols ... that at the same time are the prisoners of a Western liberal conscience and
hostages to an Islamic fundamentalist orthodoxy."); John 0. Voll, For Scholars of Islam, Interpretation
Need Not Be Advocacy, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Mar. 22, 1989, at A48 (discussing urge to abandon
considered interpretation for side-taking or "advocacy" in "heat of the debate" over Rushdie incident).
66. For a fuller discussion of Baudelaire's conception of irony, as expressed in his essay De l'Essence
du Rire, see PAUL DE MAN, The Rhetoric of Temporality, in BLINDNESS AND INSIGHT: ESSAYS IN THE
RHETORIC OF CONTEMPORARY CRITICISM 187, 211-16 (rev. ed. 1983). In the same essay, Baudelaire
writes, "Laughter is satanic: it is thus profoundly human." CHARLES BAUDELAIRE, On the Essence of
Laughter and, in General, on the Comic in the Plastic Arts (1855), reprinted in THE PAINTER OF MODERN
LIFE AND OTHER ESSAYS 147, 153 (Connoisseurship Criticism and Art History in the Nineteenth Century,
Jonathan Mayne ed. & trans., 1964).
67. Suleri, supra note 56, at 605.
68. BARBARA JOHNSON, Melville's Fist: The Execution of Billy Budd, in THE CRITICAL DIFFERENCE
79, 105-07 (1980); see also Weisberg, supra note 3, at 34-36 (discussing Johnson's essay in law-and-
literature context and noting her conclusion that "function of [legal] judgment is to turn the ambiguous into
the decidable"); cf NOONAN, supra note 52, at 113 (discussing legal simplification of facts).
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accomplish this differentiation into opposing sides, then the media-created
Rushdie incident is like "trial" in a very important sense. If so, then the
simplistic typology of the media incident may derive from the constraints on
a legal trial imposed by the local generic forms available to speakers' and
observers' consciousness and subconsciousness. Because culture has to be
ready for the story told by a trial, it influences, often by the literary genres it
has already absorbed, the kind of story that the trial ends up becoming.'
Of course, when many generic forms are available (given an international
and not a local community trial),70 generic simplification is not necessarily
prefigured, unless media representation itself is constrained by internal generic
pressures, which it very well might be. What Sara Suleri calls "journalistic
oppositions between fundamentalism and secularism" 7I are partly just
that-journalistic oppositions. Even if the medium is not the message, it at
least affects the message. But usual journalistic opposition is compounded in
the Rushdie incident, and trial metaphors within it bespeak greater truths
about what the incident itself means for the nature of legal, and not just
journalistic, understanding. Being "trial-like," the incident stands only
tropologically for trial and judgment on Rushdie and Islam, but as a metaphor
for law, it is telling and powerful.
Moreover, trial-form narratives like the Rushdie incident may take
representational cues from available literary narratives and genres-the genre
of postmodern satire (as exemplified by Rushdie, Pynchon, 7 and others)
being among those available in this case. But the capacity for selection from
available forms may be constrained by a genuinely different logic. As a legal
narrative, the Rushdie incident simplifies "differences within" The Satanic
Verses (as well as other texts) to produce dramatic but inaccurate oppositions.
The result is a visible generic difference from the central literary narrative, a
difference that comes across as gross simplification and bad faith.
Yet the Rushdie incident is also like a literary narrative in its uncanny,
almost methodical repetition of the same issues at stake in The Satanic
Verses-whether an idea compromises when weak and tolerates when
strong,74 whether the profane has not a parasitical but an essential relation to
69. See Robert A. Ferguson, Story and Transcnption in the Trial of John Brown, 6 YALE J.L. &
HuMAN. 37, 73 (1994) (discussing hidden presence of genre in transcription and interpretation of trial
event); cf. TZVETAN TODOROV, MIKHAIL BAKHTIN: THE DIALOGIC PRINCIPLE 82-45 Ovlad Godzich trans..
1984) (explaining Mikhail Bakhtin's conception of "genre" as framework that dominates understanding and
representation of social reality).
70. Cf. Richard A. Matasar, Trial Narratives and the Study of Law: Some Questions. 76 IOWA L REV.
207, 220 (1990) (reviewing POPULAR TRIALS: RHETORIC. MASS MEDIA. AND THE LAw (Robert Hanman
ed., 1990)) ("What do . . . trial participants intend to say?... Who is their audience? Is it the jury? The
press? Local society? National audiences? The world?").
71. Suleri, supra note 56, at 605.
72. See supra note 50.
73. See, e.g., THOMAS PYNCHON, THE CRYING OF LOT 49 (Bantam Books 1981) (1966).
74. See RUSHDIE, THE SATANIC VERSES, supra note I. at 95. 121. 126, 335. 467; see also Bandung
File: Interview with Salman Rushdie, supra note II. at 22 ("[W]hen you're weak, do you compromise;
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the sacred as the Orient to the Occident,7' and so on. The media incident and
the book are often thematically indistinguishable, the literary narrative
evidently so overdetermined that it has determined its own reception. As
Rushdie observed, the characters in the novel are "struggling with just the sort
of great problems that have arisen to surround the book. 7 6 Passages from
The Satanic Verses occasionally even acquire a discomforting prescience in
hindsight.Y7 When "life imitates art," the processes by which "life" is
manufactured may themselves be artful. One author expresses the common
feeling that the "dialogue between Rushdie and the infuriated Muslims, which
has now been broadcast internationally, and in which the boundaries between
fiction and reality are almost totally obliterated, may be read as the most
compelling, though unwritten chapter of the novel. 78 But even if the incident
repeats the complicated issues raised in the book, it repeats them simplistically,
within a more trial-like setting. As such, it presents interpretive issues too
strenuous for the cognitive and representational capabilities of its own medium,
and enacts a difficult marriage between law and literature that makes it
relevant to any scholarly enterprise positing an essential or potential
rapprochement between the two. A casualty of this strange admixture is that
the task of reading the incident as a whole seems both deceptively simple and
unnecessarily complex. Legal and literary tropes both succeed too well in
describing the Rushdie incident; as a result, they also narrate the uncertainty
at their mutual disciplinary boundaries.
If the Rushdie incident is itself a media-created, trial-like "legal narrative,"
it is not merely collapsible into the legal or legalistic narratives (e.g., thefatwa
and Indian ban) it contains-just as it is not collapsible into The Satanic
Verses. The incident only derives its particular authority as law-and-literature
parable by being, in itself, both legalistic and literary. Yet, the incident also
repeats the logic of its texts, for what it reveals is a similar interaction between
the primary legal and literary narratives it contains, meaning a simplification
and an appropriation for indecorous ends that each side effects on the other
when it speaks on its own. The law and literature within the Rushdie incident
are therefore both alike and at odds. Sometimes indistinguishable in power and
when you're strong, are you tolerant?").
75. See RUSHDIE, In Good Faith, supra note 27, at 401 ("I sought images that crystallized the
opposition between the sacred and profane worlds.").
76. Id. at 394.
77. See, e.g., RUSHDIE, THE SATANIc VERSES, supra note 1, at 272 ("The film was to be ... the story
of the encounter between a prophet and an archangel . . . . But would it not be seen as
blasphemous .... "); id. at 374 ("Your blasphemy, Salman, can't be forgiven. . . . To set your words
against the Words of God."); id. at 545-46 ("Salahuddin was thinking... about how he was going to die
for his verses, but could not find it in himself to call the death-sentence unjust."); cf RUSHDIE, In Good
Faith, supra note 27, at 407 ("S]iome passages in The Satanic Verses have now acquired a prophetic
quality that alarms even me.").
78. Simawe, supra note 55, at 189-90; cf Marlena G. Corcoran, Salman Rushdie's Satanic Narration,
20 IowA REv. 155, 158 (1990) ("In The Satanic Verses,] we find inscribed versions of the very
controversy over sacred and profane writing which has so colored the reception of the book.").
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effect, they nevertheless compromise each other-law simplifying literature to
achieve legal pronouncement,79 literature overstating its quasi-legal powers
to compete with law.8° The remainder of this Note will explicate the various
compromises at the law-literature boundaries within the Rushdie incident.
I1. READ ALERT: LITERARY NARRATIVE AS NARRATIVE EVIDENCE
Simplification is necessary for legal pronouncement against The Satanic
Verses because "reading" for legal purposes is different from reading for
literary purposes. As far as relative conceptions of reading are concerned, the
Rushdie incident is a parable for a terrible gap between law and literature. All
the legal narratives within it are conclusory, and because they must use a
literary narrative as evidence for their conclusions, they compromise literary
reading to align literary narrative toward their own teleological ends, even
when it is resistant to such realignment.
The best way to compromise literature is not to read it, or to paraphrase
it.8' Literary understanding is impossible without a minimal submission to the
literary medium, the text itself. Not surprisingly, the early stages of the media
incident showed Rushdie copiously chiding his critics for not having read his
book.8 2 "It is not.., the book it has been made out to be," he wrote in a
1990 essay, "that book containing 'nothing but filth and insults and abuse' that
has brought people out on to the streets across the world. That book simply
does not exist." 3 Some of Rushdie's distress was clearly coming from
different reading priorities: "It has been bewildering to learn that people...
have been willing to judge The Satanic Verses and its author, without reading
it .... It has been bewildering to learn that people do not care about art....
He went on to provide a plot summary from his viewpoint, intended to
"replace the non-existent novel with the one I actually wrote,"' knowing
nevertheless that the reading priorities were unbridgeably far apart, and that
legally potent simplifications had irretrievably influenced the tone of the rest
of the media controversy:
There are times when I feel that the original intentions of The Satanic
Verses have been so thoroughly scrambled by events as to be lost for
ever ... [,] that the terms in which the novel is discussed seem to
79. See infra part HI.
80. See infra part IV.
81. Cf. CLEANTH BROOKS, THE WELL-WROUGHT URN 192 (1947) (stating similar proposition with
regard to poetry in chapter entitled 'The Heresy of Paraphrase").
82. See, e.g., Bandung File: Interview with Salman Rushdie, supra note 11. at 23; Rushdie. An Open
Letter, supra note 13, at 34.
83. RusHDE, In Good Faith, supra note 27, at 395.
84. Id. at 397.
85. Id. at 397-403.
86. Id. at 397.
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have been set exclusively by Muslim leaders (including those ... who
can blithely say ..... "Books are not my thing").,7
Typical of the Muslim rejoinder to Rushdie's initial protests was that of
Syed Shahabuddin, Muslim MP in India:
Yes, I have not read it, nor do I intend to. I do not have to wade
through a filthy drain to know what filth is. My first inadvertent step
would tell me what I have stepped into. For me, the synopsis, the
review, the excerpts, the opinions of those who had read it and your
gloatings were enough.88
Shabbir Akhtar, spokesman for the Muslim community in Bradford,89
repeated the point bluntly, using an analogy nothing short of stunning:
[I]t is not a necessary condition of having knowledge of a work that
one should have read it, any more than it is necessary for a judge to
witness a murder in order to pass judgment. The ordinary Muslim
went by the verdict of those trusted religious and other learned
authorities who had read the whole book, much as a judge goes by
the evidence supplied by eye-witness accounts. 90
Not reading, it seemed, was the peculiar province of law.91 Instead of being
hearsay, authoritative reading had preemptive and precedential value, as both
a "verdict" already rendered and the paraphrastic "eyewitness" evidence behind
dissipated companion verdicts. Authoritative reading also signified, quite
appropriately, something like reasoned trial; but the principle for later
interpretation was deferential, in the sense that subsequent trial and judgment
could risk referring back respectfully to the original. Despite Rushdie's anxious
reminders that the novel's irony was not directed against religious faith, or that
the profanity was mouthed by unreliable characters and therefore not
expressive of authorial intention,' many Muslims remained unconvinced. 9
There are very good arguments that a close reading of The Satanic Verses
would (and did) produce just as much offense as no reading at all. Assuming,
however, that a close reading would yield different judgments (as Rushdie's
frustration suggests), reading for the purpose of legal condemnation obviously
87. Id at 403.
88. Shahabuddin, supra note 13, at 39.
89. See supra text accompanying note 15.
90. AKHTAR, supra note 20, at 40. This passage is almost more interesting for the imperfections in
the metaphor. Note that the judicial "verdict" has already been passed by "religious and other learned
authorities" before the case reaches the "ordinary Muslim" judge.
91. But cf John D. Calamari, Duty To Read-A Changing Concept, 43 FoRDHAM L. RBV. 341 (1974)
(discussing contract law doctrine imposing duty to read).
92. RtJsHIE, In Good Faith, supra note 27, at 397-403.
93. See, e.g., infra notes 144-45, 147 and accompanying text.
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requires a different interpretation of the original evidence (the literary text)-a
different story about the story. But, as Rushdie seems to urge, the literary text
itself94 should be able to offer some authoritative guidelines about how it
should be interpreted. A literary narrative is "emplotted" in a certain way.
Events follow one another in a certain sequence; words are used with certain
denotations and perhaps ironic connotations. These elements make up the plot
and its signification, the story that is being told.95 Certainly, the meaning of
a particular plot sequence or of a particular word is often ambiguous. But if
Rushdie correctly complains that legal condemnation of his story would have
been on less sure footing after close reading, then the story presumably directs
its own interpretation with a firm hand nevertheless.
One could deduce that the narrative's literary status made its self-
interpretation irrelevant to legal judgment. Yet, a part of the law-and-literature
movement seems to derive its seriousness in claiming a connection between
law and literature from an implied or express "narrativity" about law -- even
if Roland Barthes has identified narrative as precisely that form which is not
fixed as "literature. 97 It has been argued, for example, that law can gain
from literature an empathic understanding that comes out of reading
narrativized experience,95 and that courtroom evidence is most reliable as
particular, individualized, and experiential narrative. 99 In short, law is said to
94. The idea of an isolatable "literary text itself" is naive. But further definition is beyond the scope
of this Note.
95. I am simplifying the idea of "emplotment." Hayden White calls it the process of arranging events
"in a series that is at once chronologically and syntactically structured, in the way that any discourse from
a sentence all the way up to a novel is structured." Hayden White, The Historical Text as Literary Artifact
(1974), reprinted in CRmCAL THEORY SINCE 1965, at 395. 402 (Hazard Adams & Leroy Searle cds..
1986).
96. See generally Marie Ashe, The "'Bad Mother" in Law and Literature: A Problem of
Representation, 43 HASTINGS Li. 1017, 1030 (1992) (positing importance of literary narrative in
displacement of stereotypes); Cover, supra note 22, at 5 ("In this normative world, law and narrative are
inseparably related."); William N. Eskridge, Jr.. Gaylegal Narratives, 46 STAN. L. REV. 607 (1994)
(responding to critique of legal storytelling movement by Daniel Farber and Suzanna Sherry); Robin West
Jurisprudence as Narrative: An Aesthetic Analysis of Modern Legal Theory, 60 N.Y.U. L REv. 145 (1985)
(advocating reading of legal theory as form of narrative and recognizing aesthetic dimension of legal
debate).
97. ROLAND BARTHES, IMAGE--MUSIC-TEXT 79 (Stephen Heath trans.. 1977) ("[Nlarrative ts present
in myth, legend, fable, tale, novella, epic, history, tragedy, drama. comedy, mime, painting .... stained
glass windows, cinema, comics, news item, conversation.").
98. See, e.g., Robin West, Economic Man and Literary Woman: One Contrast. 39 MERCER L REv.
867, 875 (1988).
99. See Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process. 84 HARV.
L. REV. 1329, 1349 (1971). Admittedly, Tribe did not intend to comment about relations between law and
literature. But his preference for narrative evidence easily leads into work like Robin \Vest's. See Robin
L. West, Taking Preferences Seriously, 64 TUL L. REv. 659, 665. 686 (1990) (emphasizing importance
of particular, concrete stories in case-by-case adjudication); cf. WILLIA TWINING. RETHINKING EVIDmENCE:
EXPLORATORY ESSAYS 223 (1990) (identifying particularity as necessary element of legal -stories-); Daniel
A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School: An Essay on Legal Narratives. 45 STAN. L
REV. 807, 811 (1993) (linking feminist commitment to particularity with legal storytelling movement);
Richard K. Sherwin, The Narrative Construction of Legal Reality. 18 VT. L. REV. 681, 685 (1994) (-The
new discourse comes from scholars who study particular legal contexts and who seek to give life to
particular (often unheard) voices and dramas in the legal culture.").
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be like literature in that it has good use for narrative-a legal pronouncement
is usually backed (or should be) by a story, a historical explanation based on
the evidence at hand."°° As J. Hillis Miller puts it, "the just application of the
law depends on getting a story straight about what happened .... The appeal
to precedent in law means, most often, the appeal to an agreed-upon
narrative .... ,10
But what the Rushdie incident seems to show is that it is not enough, in
establishing a law-literature rapprochement, to say that law makes use of
narrative, because different kinds of narrative make all the difference in the
world. For legal narrative, the relevant question in the Rushdie incident is
evidentiary in character-how should evidence be read and reconstructed to
support the legal narrative legitimating the legal judgment that draws from this
evidence? This kind of reading may have an antithetical relation to reading in
the literary sense, especially when the evidence to be read is itself a literary
narrative. Though judgments about literary reading are matters of opinion, the
Rushdie incident shows that law can do injustice to literature by
misrepresenting it, by imposing on literature a distant, other logic. The word
"justice" itself, like the word "representation," has both aesthetic/mimetic and
politico-legal meaning.'O° As Pygmalion, we look for justice in perfect
likeness, in a simulacrum that "does justice to" (or tells the truth about)
something else.0 3 As King Oedipus, we may even have to do justice to
ourselves for the burdens of statecraft." 4 If Akhtar's analogy' °5 is
extended, however, legal judgment demands interruption and rupture of literary
narrative by an other, mediating interpretive narrative that acquires
authoritative evidentiary status by re-emplotment and even replacement of the
original literary evidence. Justice requires doing injustice to literature.
Yet, the process of constructing coherent legal reality by censoring,
subordinating, and highlighting portions of the evidentiary corpus is itself
artistic. Constructing a story from an amorphous mass of evidence requires
creativity, even inspiration. It may involve censorship in a general sense-parts
have to be cut out, other parts emphasized. But literary narratives are
themselves guilty of suppressing in order to tell. As the narrator of Shame, one
of Rushdie's earlier literary works, puts it, "And now I must stop saying what
I am not writing about, because there's nothing so special about that; every
100. Another related similarity between law and literature is that both are rhetorical. See Brook
Thomas, Reflections on the Law and Literature Revival, 17 CRITICAL INQUIRY 510, 523 (1991).
101. J. Hillis Miller, Laying Down the Law in Literature: The Example of Kleist, in DECONSTRUCTION
AND THE POSSIBILITY oF JUs'rIcE 305, 306 (Drucilla Cornell et al. eds., 1992).
102. Cf. BARBARA JOHNSON, The Frame of Reference: Poe, Lacan, Derrida, in TlE CRITICAL
DIFFERENCE, supra note 68, at 110, 111 (punning on legal and mimetic senses of "justice"); PAUL DE MAN,
ALLEGORIES OF READING 269-70 (1979) (same).
103. See I ROBERT GRAVES, THE GREEK MYTHS 211 (1955).
104. See 2 id. at 9-15. Oedipus' self-blinding is the traditionally "blind" objectivity of Justice turned
inward into heightened subjectivity, i.e., into self-realization and more accurate self-representation.
105. See supra text accompanying note 90.
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story one chooses to tell is a kind of censorship, it prevents the telling of other
tales."' 6 The same applies to legal narrative, as Clare Dalton writes (with
specific reference to contract doctrine):
The telling of [doctrinal] stories-like the telling of any story-is, in
one sense, an impoverishing exercise: The infinitely rich potential that
we call reality is stripped of detail, of all but a few of its aspects. But
it is only through this restriction of content that any story has a
meaning.
10 7
Every story must censor to keep its thread and make its point, as also must,
in slightly different ways, sentences and words-a cat is called a cat in part to
keep it from being identified as a tiger,'08 a man called a man to keep him
from being called a giant. 109 That there is something artistic about
constructing a story from what Dalton calls "the infinitely rich potential that
we call reality" seems undeniable. The construction of historical reality from
historical evidence is what Hayden White has called the literary or "fictive"
aspect of history making," ° insomuch as meaningfully emplotting a set of
data with ambiguous meaning is itself a primary creative act. The only
problem, according to White, is that a set of data can be emplotted in many
different ways."' Where no emplotment suggests itself as the superior or
correct one, the historian's dilemma is that the story she tells seems like one
among many plausible stories that could be told from the same data. There is
not enough resistance from the facts.
For White, the process of documenting history is thus literary because
historical facts are never enough in themselves to make "history." Similarly,
if legal judgment can and should be backed by historical, narrative
explanation," 2 then construction of legal reality from evidence may be one
of the most literary aspects of lawmaking. But the Rushdie incident qualifies
this leap by showing that when what is being selectively censored and
106. SALMAN RUSHDIE, SHAME 72-73 (Vintage Int'l 1989) (1983).
107. Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine. 94 YALE L.J. 997. 1113
(1985); cf. Marianne Wesson, Historical Truth. Narrative Truth, and Expert Testimony, 60 WASH. L REv.
331, 338, 346 (1985) (discussing tendency of expert witnesses to reconstruct events in manner that is
"useful" for story being told, at expense of actual, historical truth).
108. My example is an artless reappropriation of a passage from literary theorist Paul de Man. PAUL
DE MAN, The Resistance to Theory, in THE RESISTANCE TO THEORY 3, 5 (1986).
109. See JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, Essay on the Origin of Languages Which Treats of Melody and
Musical Imitation, in ON THE ORIGIN OF LANGUAGE 5, 13 (John H. Moran trans.. 1966) (using same
example to argue for initial figurativeness of language); cf. Wlad Godzich, The 7iger on the Paper Mat.
Foreword to PAUL DE MAN, THE RESISTANCE TO THEORY, supra note 108, at xiii N'lin the play on the
size of the cat and on its putative fearsomeness, de Man further alludes to ... the famous passage on the
'giant' in Rousseau .... ).
110. White, supra note 95, at 407.
111. Id at 403 ("[T]he series can be emplotted in a number of different ways and thereby endowed
with different meanings without violating the imperatives of the chronological arrangement at all.-).
112. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
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highlighted to create legal reality is not "the infinitely rich potential that we
call reality" but another literary narrative,"3 then law and literature seem
to diverge. Reconstructing amorphous evidence into a coherent story may be
creative in the literary sense, but reconstructing an existing literary story into
another coherent story may be barbaric to the existing literary sensibility.
When law dominates literature, what White has called the problem of multiple
possible emplotments. 4 becomes a problem of multiple possible re-
emplotments. Even if religiously defined legality chooses a different re-
emplotment from the one chosen by "liberal" or "public will" legality, the
latter will also necessarily re-emplot and compromise the existing literary
narrative-accordingly, free speech arguments in the Rushdie incident seem
equipped only to misuse and simplify the novel's intimate concern with
religious belief. No doubt the legal re-emplotment of literature requires an
aggressive reading of literature, possibly even aggressive enough to be a non-
reading.
The Rushdie parable teaches that even if law-and-literature scholarship
uses "narrative" as a law-literature connecting principle, production of legal
narrative may depend on a compromising of literary reading. Such compromise
means reconstruction of and violence to literary evidence, though this
reconstruction itself is a creative, almost literary act. If law is capable of
functioning as a sobering reality principle against literature's overextended
reach, then the relationship between law and literature defies any idealistic or
transcendental conciliation. Somewhere in the law-literature boundary, there is
a frictional resistance; assimilation cannot come without nonideal transaction
costs." 5 Nowhere else is this resistance so foregrounded in a difference
between law and literature as where law has to pass judgment on literature.
IV. LITERATURE AS QUASI-LEGAL INSTRUMENT
Despite this difference, the similarities between literature and lawmaking
are also eerily foregrounded as perhaps nowhere else in the Rushdie incident
and in Rushdie's roman a clef career generally. In one sense, this is obvious.
Rushdie's literature affects people's material lives, just as law does. Pdople
113. To be sure, part of the evidentiary corpus justifying legal and nonlegal condemnation of Rushdie
has nothing to do with his literary narrative. One seemingly objective source, for example, takes a personal
jab: "Rushdie... has also been mobile with his women." "Simon Rushton" aka Salman Rushdie, supra
note 41, at 67.
114. See supra text accompanying note I 11.
115. Cf. Godzich, supra note 109, at xii-xiii ("The term resistance means a property of matter
recognized since antiquity: its perceptibility to touch and inertial opposition to muscular exertion....
Resistance is a property of the referent, we would say today .... ); Duncan Kennedy, Freedom and
Constraint in Adjudication: A Critical Phenomenology, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 518, 526 (1986) ("Resistance
or opposition is the characteristic of the law when I anticipate it as a constraint .... [O]ne of the ways
in which we experience law ... is as a medium in which one pursues a project .... When we approach
it this way, law constrains as a physical medium constrains .... ).
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take offense when writers refer to them or their religious heritage explicitly
and disparagingly under the guise of fiction. Other writers besides Rushdie
have marked society in a similar fashion." 6 Political fiction (like some of
Rushdie's earlier work) treads on especially dangerous ground when it offends
in this manner. It can function just like a rival government. In a further sense,
such fiction actually competes with the official story, even with history-and
since law itself may compete with history by relying on fact-based evidentiary
narratives that reread the facts for law's own purposes," 7 such fiction also
competes with law. This Part shows that Rushdie has always aspired to write
fiction that competes with history and law in precisely these terms. Yet he has
also occasionally emphasized the limitations on fiction imposed by its own
fictionality, even if, according to some, he later overused fictionality to
predicate polemical retreat after he was placed in a defensive position. While
the Rushdie incident powerfully demonstrates that fiction is quite up to the task
of competing with law, the fact-fiction disjunctions that Rushdie highlighted
after thefatwa are equally valid. Therefore, the assertion of literature as quasi-
legal, taken in the strongest possible sense, requires a misunderstanding of
law's very different material origins and effects.
If law characteristically reinscribes history for its own ends, then Rushdie's
fiction claims quasi-legal status in the same way that J. Hillis Miller suggests
Heinrich von Kleist's fiction does: "[T]he reader concerned with the potential
lawmaking power of literature is made uneasy .... It is impossible to tell
from any markers within the story itself where history stops and fiction
begins .... , While The Satanic Verses is not patently based on high-
profile recent history, like Midnight's Children and Shame,"' it does have
some contemporary factual allusions, though, as one author writes, "few
readers are likely to understand more than a fraction of the references."'20
Moreover, Rushdie himself has emphasized the extent of historical record on
the Prophet Muhammad's life,'2 ' so that his reimagining of the birth of Islam
certainly competes with the official story on which Islam and Islamic law are
founded.
116. For examples of other literary works that directly or indirectly resulted in controversy. see NIKOs
KAzANTZAKIS, THE LAST TEMPTATION OF CHRIST (P.A. Bien trans.. 1960); GORE VtDAL, MYRA
BRECKINRIDGE (Random House 1986) (1968).
117. Cf. Wesson, supra note 107, at 338. 346.
118. Hillis Miller, supra note 101, at 310.
119. Consider Rushdie's own statement that "'Midnight's Children had history as a scaffolding on
which to hang the book; [The Satanic Verses] doesn't.'" French. supra note 34. at 43. repnnted in T7HE
RUSHDIE FILE, supra note 6, at 6-7.
120. PIPES, supra note 9. at 54.
121. Shrabani Basu, Of Satan, Archangels and Prophets. SUNDAY (India). Sept. 18-24. 1988. reprinted
in THE RUSHDIE FLE, supra note 6, at 32. 33 (interview with Salman Rushdie) ("He's the only prophet
who exists even remotely inside history."). But cf. Bandung File: Interview with Salman Rushdie. supra
note 11, at 22 ("[O]ne can't really speak with absolute certainty about that period of Mohammed's life. The
records are very partial and ambiguous. But he is ... the only prophet who exists even partially in
history.").
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Before the fatwa, Rushdie had already abstracted this habit of competing
into an aesthetic of turf warfare. Rushdie's literature was to relate to history
(and, implicitly, law) as a rival, undertaking to remake history in its own
normative image. Because writers and politicians both "try to make the world
in their own images," Rushdie wrote in 1982, "they fight for the same
territory," and therefore, "literature can, and perhaps must, give the lie to
official facts."'"2 In his 1984 essay Outside the Whale, Rushdie posited
"literature" as a quasi-legal instrument of social construction and change, and
in fact, as just that which can decide the historian's dilemma"z by providing
a superior, more correct story about reality:
The modem world lacks not only hiding places, but certainties.
There is no consensus about reality between, for example, the nations
of the North and of the South. What President Reagan says is
happening in Central America differs so radically from, say, the
Sandinista version, that there is almost no common ground. It
becomes necessary to take sides .... It seems to me imperative that
literature enter such arguments, because what is being disputed is
nothing less than what is the case, what is truth and what untruth. If
writers leave the business of making pictures of the world to
politicians, it will be one of history's great and most abject
abdications.
Outside the whale is the ... continual quarrel, the dialectic of
history. Outside the whale there is a genuine need for political fiction,
for books that draw new and better maps of reality, and make new
languages with which we can understand the world. 24
Nothing succeeds like success. Apparently, literature can make its competing
picture of the world more effectively than Rushdie had bargained for. As
Edward Said has since suggested, if the above-quoted passage says that writers
of fiction cannot be "insulated from history and politics," then it applies to
Rushdie's later predicament in an "ominously prophetic," ironic manner. 12
Outside the Whale, however complex and self-aware it may be, is neither
ironically intended nor esoterically coded. Yet it is plainly capable of meaning
more than its author can handle. Later incredulous about responses to The
122. SALMAN RUSHDIE, Imaginary Homelands, in IMAGINARY HOMELANDS, supra note 27, at 9. 14.
123. See supra text accompanying note 111.
124. SALMAN RuSHDIE, Outside the Whale, in IMAGINARY HOMELANDS, supra note 27, at 87, 100;
cf. Sohail Inayatullah, Understanding the Postmodern World: Why Khomeini Wants Rushdie Dead. THIRD
TExT, Summer 1990, at 91, 91-93 (1990) (urging thatfatwa and The Satanic Verses are similar in that both
are ways of responding to modem world); Harold Hongju Koh, Justice Blackmun and the "World Out
There", 104 YALE LJ. 23, 25 (1994) ("These searing experiences taught him that Justices have no choice
but to take sides ....").
125. Edward W. Said, Statement at Public Meeting (Feb. 22, 1989), in THE RuSHDIB FILE, supra
note 6, at 164, 164.
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Satanic Verses,'26 perhaps Rushdie had not mastered the full import of his
own categories before writing; perhaps he had failed to anticipate the kind of
material consequences at stake in law, history, and politics.
Such a reading has to be qualified in one obvious way. If Outside the
Whale constatively establishes that "literature is like law" (as opposed to
"literature is law"), it already implies the further qualification that literature is
also not like law-apples are like oranges only because they are also not like
oranges, otherwise they would simply be oranges. Moreover, even if Rushdie
overstated the case for quasi-legal fiction in Outside the Whale, he was not
unaware, even then, of fiction's genuinely fictional objectives. In a 1983
response to disgruntled readers of Midnight's Children, he wrote that they
"wanted... [Midnight's Children] to be the history, even the guidebook,
which it was never meant to be ... [and] were judging the book not as a
novel, but as some sort of inadequate reference book or encyclopaedia."', 7
Later, he pressed a similar defense in aid of The Satanic Verses. "I am not
trying to say," he wrote in 1990, "that The Satanic Verses is 'only a novel'
and thus need not be taken seriously . . . ."' But,
to say that ... literature and politics ... fight for the same territory
... is very different from somehow knowing, in advance, that... the
conflict your work seeks to explore is about to engulf it... and you.
... Fiction uses facts as a starting-place and then spirals away to
explore its real concerns, which are only tangentially historical. Not
to see this, to treat fiction as if it were fact, is to make a serious
mistake of categories.
129
That is, political fiction and political action should not be the same for
purposes of legal condemnation.
Rushdie had essentially stated, even before thefatva (though in response
to already simmering protest), that The Satanic Verses was not about to
compete with history and law in the strong sense. In an interview shortly
before thefatwa, he said, "The one thing you learn as an historian is just how
fragmented and ambiguous and peculiar the historical record is. So I thought,
126. See WEATHERBY, supra note 9. at 150 ("'I feel completely horrified about what happened in
Pakistan .... .'" (quoting Rushdie)); The Marked Man: A Writer Driven by Life to Dissent. SUNDAY TwIES
(London), Feb. 19, 1989, at A17, reprinted in THE RUSHDIE FILE. supra note 6. at 1. 3 ('If I thought this
whirlwind was going to be unleashed, I could not have written.'" (quoting Rushdie)); cf. Basu, supra note
121, at 32 ("'[I]t would be absurd to think that a book can cause riots.'" (quoting Rushdie)). But see
Bandung File: Interview with Salman Rushdie, supra note 11, at 21 ("1 expected that the mullahs wouldn't
like it.").
127. SALMAN RUSHDIF, "Errata": Or, Unreliable Narration in Midnight's Children [hereinafter
RUSHDIE., Errata], in IMAGINARY HOMELANDS, supra note 27, at 22. 25.
128. RUSHDIE, In Good Faith, supra note 27, at 393.
129. Id. at 408-09.
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well, let's not try and pretend to be writing a history."' 130 This already
qualifies his earlier opinion that literature should enter into arguments about
"what is the case."'31 He continued: "[I thought,] [1]et's take the themes I'm
interested in and fantasise them... so that we don't have to get into the issue:
did this really happen like this or did it not?"'13
2
In fact, Rushdie's shifting commitments to politics and imagination are too
easily characterized as opportunistic reactions to opposition. The terms of his
nonfictional self-defense after thefatwa are indeed more simplistic, binary, and
facile than The Satanic Verses itself.' 33 His uncharacteristic fervor about
fictionality is clearly defensive, and his implication that fiction and action
merit different legal treatment is essentially a justification for liberal free
speech protection of a novel that, on its own terms, probably denies the
rationalist (if not moral) certainty undergirding arguments for free speech. 134
Had The Satanic Verses been able to speak to Rushdie after thefatwa, it would
have certainly told him to stop making sense. But it is a mistake to see this
enforced simplification as Rushdie's compromise, prompted by the incident.
If anything, the "compromise" preexisted its own incidental exposure. The
author's feeble progression from overstatement of literature's powers to
overstatement of its limitations is better understood as a coexisting affinity and
gap between law and literature, as an ability in both to compromise and to
dominate the other. Rushdie did state literature's abilities too expansively, but
literature's legal and political powers, its ability to effect material
consequences, compete with and compromise law, are visibly impressive. If
Rushdie went on to overstate literature's limitations and different priorities,
literature nevertheless does have these limitations, even when it changes
people's lives as profoundly as it did in this case.
V. MULTIPLE VOICES IN LAW AND LITERATURE
Part Im showed that the paraphrasing/misreading/not-reading of literature
necessary to achieve legal pronouncement in the Rushdie incident is a special
case of, or a parable for, the simultaneous affinity and divergence between law
and literature. Since many close readers were no doubt also offended by The
130. Bandung File: Interview with Salman Rushdie, supra note 11, at 22.
131. See supra text accompanying note 124.
132. Bandung File: Interview with Salman Rushdie, supra note 11, at 22.
133. See S. Nomanul Haq, Salman Rushdie Did Wrong, INT'L HERALD TRIB. (Sing.), Feb. 24, 1989,
reprinted in THE KISS OF JUDAS, supra note 19, at 35, 35 (using Rushdie's own fictional preoccupation
with history against him to argue that he should have been sensitive to cultural context); RICHARD
WEBSTER, A BRIEF HISTORY OF BLASPHEMY: LIDBERALISM, CENSORSHIP AND "THE SATANIC VERSES" 89
(1990) (chastising Rushdie for rediscovering "naive faith" in expressibility or identifiability of authorial
intention in order to proclaim "good faith" intentions); cf RUSHDIE, THE SATANIC VERSES, supra note 1.
at 427 ("Mhis sounds, does it not, dangerously like an intentionalist fallacy?").
134. For a discussion of disparities between The Satanic Verses and the free speech arguments later
used to justify it, see supra note 56 and accompanying text.
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Satanic Verses,135 the law and literature within the Rushdie incident also
require another comparison: specifically, a comparison of their relative
conceptions and accommodations of authorial intention. As this Part shows, the
Rushdie incident contributes to a sharp sense of difference between novelistic
literature and fundamentalist legality in terms of their relative conceptions of
authorial intention-the former allowing authorial intention to be diluted into
and overpowered by contesting voices within the novel; the latter demanding,
even imposing ex machina, a fully intending, univocal author'3 who can be
held responsible.
As this Part also shows, certain "pluralist" responses to thefatwa seem to
trivialize this law-literature opposition by championing literary multivoicedness
as befitting a perfectly pluralist, multicultural legal society. But these
arguments reconcile law and literature at three unseen insincerities. First,
semaphoring novelistic multivoicedness into legal protection of cultural
diversity is playing fast-and-loose; it reappropriates "differences within" a
literary work (in the form of contesting voices) to legitimate a legalistic
sanctioning of certain "differences between" people. 37 As such, it also
simplifies and censors literary objectives for its own purposes. Second, to the
extent that pluralist legal society is not perfectly pluralist and pluralist ideals
do not match real conditions, the seeming law-literature marriage can
justifiably be said to mask a battle of ideologies (secular vs. fundamentalist),
a conflict of laws so to speak. Third, the "law" that even pluralist society relies
on might have historical and conceptual attachments to a quasi-religious
authoritarianism.
Finally, this Part argues that the putative law-literature opposition
forefronted in the Rushdie incident might also be understood as a struggle
between competing literary ideologies, since Islamic legal society perceives
little difference between the categories of law, religion, and literature. If
Islamic religious texts and the legal narratives that derive authority from them
are themselves self-consciously literary texts, then the nature of the law-
literature opposition in the Rushdie incident obviously requires rethinking.
A. Traces of "Rushdie" in Rushdie's Novel
Fiction comes with the disclaimer that it may be unreliable when compared
to a Michelin guide. As Rushdie peevishly replied to those who had found
historical errors in Midnight's Children, "It is ... obvious, I hope, that Saleem
135. Cf. PIPES, supra note 9, at 113.
136. By "fully intending, univocal author," I mean one who conveys her intent through fictional voices
(characters or narrator, for example) that serve largely as mouthpieces for this one intent (hence the word
"univocal"). The most elementary example is the lyric poet. if the poetic voice can be taken as an
autobiographical one.
137. See supra text accompanying note 68.
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Sinai is an unreliable narrator, and that Midnight's Children is far from being
an authoritative guide to the history of post-independence India.' 38 Here,
denial of authorial culpability turns on the implication that Rushdie himself is
not Saleem Sinai, that even if the character shares characteristics with the
author, he is not simply a mouthpiece for the author. This argument itself was
a large part of Rushdie's self-defense after the fatwa. For even if it is granted
that words and passages from The Satanic Verses are blasphemous, 39 the
question remains-whose blasphemy is it? Where Muslims took offense when
profanity was attached to revered figures, Rushdie retorted that the words were
spoken by characters in the novel and therefore not expressive of authorial
viewpoint, 40 or that they were dreamed by one of the characters and hence
mediated by that character's subjectivity.'4' Of course, a distinctly authorial
voice does exist in parts of The Satanic Verses, as in the following cheeky
reverie:
Halfway between Allahgod and homosap, .... [angels] did [doubt]:
challenging God's will one day they hid muttering beneath the
Throne, daring to ask forbidden things: antiquestions. Is it right that.
Could it not be argued. Freedom, the old antiquest. He calmed them
down, naturally, employing management skills h la god. Flattered
them: you will be the instruments of my will .... Human beings are
tougher nuts ....
I know; devil talk. Shaitan interrupting Gibreel.
Me?
142
Though this irreverence appears to be coming directly from "Salman Rushdie,"
however, the "free will" of characters to do and say as they please can apply
to the first-person narrator as well. In fact, the passage plays with this very
uncertainty, and arouses the reader precisely by inviting her to look who's
talking. Even the final doubt about who actually is the responsible devil
("Me?") has doubtful authorial origin.'43
Many offended close readers (as well as nonreaders) responded to the
assertion of authorial distance and dispassion by arguing that it was only a
trick to disguise actual blasphemous intent. Indeed, the greater the authorial
distance, the greater then seemed the author's craftiness. Often, such readers
138. RusHDIF, Errata, supra note 127, at 22-23.
139. The novel occasionally provides interpretive alternatives that are not blasphemous. See, e.g.,
PPES, supra note 9, at 67 ('This closing incident to Mahound's life can be read in either of two ways, one
inimical to Islam, the other not.").
140. RUsHDIE, In Good Faith, supra note 27, at .401 ("[IThe insults quoted are clearly not mine but
those hurled at the faithful by the ungodly.").
141. Id. at 399 ("(l]t must be remembered that the waking Gibreel is a coarse-mouthed fellow, and
it would be surprising if... [his] dream-figures ... did not sometimes speak [like him].").
142. RUSHDIE, THE SATANIC VERsEs, supra note 1, at 92-93.
143. This technique of self-conscious, first-person narration is repeated throughout the book, in playful
alternation between renunciation and reassumption of trustworthy voice. See, e.g., id. at 10, 133, 408-09.
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used metaphors of hiding-thus Rushdie was accused of hiding blasphemous
intent behind "narrative and stylistic tricks" like dream sequences and
blaspheming characters.' 44 "You cannot take shelter behind the plea that after
all it is a dream sequence in a piece of fiction," wrote Shahabuddin. "[Y]our
act is not unintentional .... It was deliberate and consciously planned with
devilish forethought . . . .,,45 Another response, reminiscent of American
Commerce Clause jurisprudence,' 46 was interesting: "Verbal distancing from
blasphemy is easier than financial 'distancing'. I assume Salman Rushdie is
still collecting royalties ....
B. The Bakhtinian Novel
This relentless search for authorial intention in narratives that legitimate
hostile legal pronouncement against Rushdie suggests that fundamentalist legal
proscription is at odds with novelistic literary narrative. The novel, according
to the going conception, is the genre in which multiple, competing voices each
get their "day in court" before a largely impartial, or at least not immediately
positionally identifiable, author. As the narratologist Mikhail Bakhtin has
popularly been taken to mean, the novel, unlike the lyric poem, is the genre
in which authorial voice can be overtaken by competing, variously
untrustworthy voices, while the "negatively capable"'"" author suspends side-
taking.'49 The novel is "dialogic," because voices compete within it through
intersubjective dialogue, without any particular subjectivity necessarily
privileged as representative of the authorial voice. Not surprisingly, several of
Rushdie's defenders (including Rushdie himself) either mentioned Bakhtin or
took the Bakhtinian line in situating the novel within the incident.'5 Of
144. Jussawalla, supra note 41, at 110-I1.
145. Shahabuddin, supra note 13, at 39.
146. Specifically, it resembles the logic of cases enabling broad use of the commerce power. See. e.g.,
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 305 (1964) (using commerce power for civil rights policing) ("The
power of the Congress in this field is broad and sweeping .... The Civil Rights Act of 1964 ... we find
to be plainly appropriate in the resolution of what the Congress found to be a natonal commercial
problem .... ).
147. A Testimony, AFR. EVENTS (London), Feb. 1991, at 37. 39 (interview with Ali A. Mazrui),
reprinted in SACRILEGE, supra note 40, at 312, 312.
148. "Negative capability" is a criterion of detachment that English poet John Keats applied to
distinguish good authors from bad. Letter from John Keats to George and Thomas Keats (Dec. 21. 1817).
in THE LETrERS OF JOHN KEATS 69, 71 (Maurice Buxton Forman ed., 1952); cf. Weisberg. supra note 3.
at 16 (discussing use of "negative capability" in work of Roberto Unger).
149. For similar discussion of the novel by Bakhtin. see M.M. BAKHTTN. THE DtLOGic lIAlNATION
324-25 (Caryl Emerson trans., Michael Holquist ed. & trans.. 1981).
150. Carlos Fuentes, Words Apart, GUARDIAN (London). Feb. 24. 1989. at 29, repnnted in THE
RUsHDIE FtLE, supra note 6. at 241, 241 ("I have thought a lot about Bakhtin while thinking about Salman
Rushdie .... ); Conference at the Institute of Contemporary Arts in London (Mar. 19. 1989). in THE
RUSHDIE Fm.F, supra note 6, at 179, 182 (comments of Maggie Gee) (arguing that novel form is "inherently
blasphemous"); id. at 188 (comments of Malise Ruthven) (agreeing with Maggie Gee). cf. HOMI K.
BHABHA, THE LOCATION OF CULTURE 226 (1994) ("It is the medium Rushdie uses to reinterpret the Koran
that constitutes the crime."); SALMAN RUSHDIE, Is Nothing Sacred?, in IMAGINARY HOMELANDS. supra
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course, the vision of fiction as preferably positionless already compromises
Rushdie's earlier argument that fiction should take sides. And, undoubtedly,
an author entertaining blasphemous stances within a novel without adopting
them can still be foreseeably offensive. In that sense, Rushdie's retreat behind
Bakhtinian principles may be a questionable defensive tactic. But on the other
hand, even side-taking fiction, by virtue of its literariness, may imply a
different kind of authorial intentionality than that with which the law normally
concerns itself.
In literary critical terms, the implications of Bakhtinian writerliness for
Rushdie's intentionality are legion. Multivoicedness has the obvious sense of
multiple characters and voices, with no voice clearly representative of the
author. In authors like Rushdie, multivoicedness carries the related sense of
ironic double talk (multiple voices within a single speaking voice), where
characters and author say or allow to be said the opposite of what they mean,
with sarcastic effect-this is what literary critics might call a betrayal of self-
mimesis in false repetition, a consistently deadpan or sardonic renunciation of
sincerity. More generally, this kind of writerliness implies an ironic tone,
which Rushdie's work certainly has.' If ironic double talk and a
persistently ironic tone mean that what is stated cannot be trusted to have been
sincerely stated, it is also important to recognize that in Rushdie's fiction, just
as in many other ironic literary works, disdain for what has been stated does
not make it easier to identify authorial position in a determinate "unsaid."
Rather, the more fitting model for Rushdie's fiction is Wayne Booth's
description of multiple ironies canceling each other out and ending as
positionlessly as they started.'52
C. Consequences of Bakhtinian Multivoicedness
The question of Rushdie's intentionality is thus different depending on
whether intentionality is at stake for a narrative justifying legal judgment or
for a narrative of literary criticism. Bakhtinian multivoicedness is aesthetically
pleasing to a literary critic but either nonassimilable or incomprehensible for
purposes of fundamentalist legal pronouncement. The hostile response to The
Satanic Verses represents a failure to read irony as innocent because expressive
of authorial distance. This may be a characteristic of law generally. Early
American courts also refused to recognize any ambiguities in ironic posturing,
note 27, at 415, 420 ("[Wlhereas religion ... privilege[s] one language above all others.. . the novel has
always been about the way in which different... narratives quarrel .... ).
151. See RUTHVEN, supra note 20, at 11 ("Irony? Or something more uncanny? Irony seems too feeble
a term to... [describe] The Satanic Verses .... "); see also JAMES HARRISON, SALMAN RUSHDIE 116
(Twayne's English Author Series No. 488, 1992) (categorizing novel as "social satire"); Conference at the
Institute of Contemporary Arts in London, supra note 150, at 191 (comments of Marina Warner) (finding
novel to be progeny of tradition of "moral satire").
152. WAYNE C. BOOTH, A RHETORIC OF IRONY 62 (1974).
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and generally took satire or sarcasm to present incriminating mens rea for
purposes of a blasphemy charge.'53
Conversely, literary critics could never be prosecutors, and not only for
their different ideas about multivoicedness: What the celebrated English
professor Walter Jackson Bate said about Samuel Johnson--that interpreting
him meant encountering him on the way back, that he had always already
discovered the interpretation being given him'54-may be a compliment
coming from Bate, but is surely intended to incriminate when coming from
Shahabuddin.15
5
Rushdie's later complaint against such prosecutorial judgment reasserted
his underlying writerliness: "He did it on purpose is one of the strangest
accusations ever levelled at a writer. Of course I did it on purpose. The
question is, and it is what I have tried to answer: what is the 'it' that I
did?"'156 The Satanic Verses is almost certainly aware of its blasphemous
potential, even if when Rushdie "expected that the mullahs wouldn't like
it,"' 57 he probably did not expect a media-effected death sentence. As Sara
Suleri writes, "one of the most seductive aspects of The Satanic Verses is the
author's acute consciousness of its status as blasphemy."'5 8 Rushdie's
qualification ("what is the 'it' that I did") refines this characterization by
claiming a use of blasphemy for other ends.'
59
153. Note, Blasphemy, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 694, 705 (1970). See generally LEONARD W. LEVY,
BLASPHEMY: VERBAL OFFENSE AGAINST THE SACRED, FROM MOSES TO SALMAN RUSIDIE (1993).
154. W. JACKSON BATE, SAMUEL JOHNSON 4-5 (1977). The sense that Johnson might be anticipating
and defeating the interpreter's expectations is submerged in Bate's assessment, the plain meaning of which
is to extol Johnson's breadth of subject matter. Still, one gets the sentiment in Bate that he would not mind
being mastered by Johnson in the former, more radical sense.
155. See Shahabuddin, supra note 13, at 39 ("It was deliberate and consciously planned with devilish
forethought .... ).
156. RUSHDIE, In Good Faith, supra note 27, at 410. For a critique of Rushdie's attempt to answer
for the "it," see WEBSTER, supra note 133, at 89. David Berry alerted me to the possibility of reading
Rushdie's question as "an honest, un-rhetorical question to which he doesn't know the answer more than
[other readers]." Powerful legal and literary texts themselves "speakfirst, by communicating to the reader
his own innermost thought . . . [like) Lincoln's second inaugural address, which astonished some
contemporaries by speaking the truth of their collective suffering, the truth they recognized at once but had
never heard before." Letter from David Berry, Ph.D. Candidate in English and American Literature.
Harvard University, to author (Dec. 4, 1994) (on file with author).
157. Bandung File: Interview with Salman Rushdie, supra note 11, at 21.
158. Suleri, supra note 56, at 606.
159. The legitimate kernel in Rushdie's protest must be a proposed distinction between intent to write
everything he wrote and what is often called "malicious intent." the kind of intent that the American
common law of blasphemy often required for incrimination, to exclude the offender "who fairly and
conscientiously promulgates the opinions with whose truth he is impressed." Note, Blasphemy. supra note
153, at 705 (quoting State v. Chandler, 2 Del. (I Harr.) 553, 564 (1837)); cf. RUSHDIE, In Good Faith,
supra note 27, at 405 ("I do not accept the charge of blasphemy, because, as somebody says in The Satanic
Verses, 'where there is no belief, there is no blasphemy."'). Whether or not the writing of The Satanic
Verses qualifies as something like "wanton disregard" also seems relevant.
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D. Bakhtinian Dialogism as Liberal Dialogue
The question is, can literary dialogism have ideological significance for a
counternarrative that might be used with legalistic import to defend Rushdie
against censorship? As many will agree, the artistic quality of speech should
be relatively irrelevant to its enjoyment of legal protection. But some of
Rushdie's fellow men and women of letters came close to arguing for the
multivoiced novel in terms that evoked the pluralist legal state. E.L. Doctorow,
for example, observed that "[t]he writer['s] ...mind is a democracy of
contentious voices, each claiming to be the truth."' °
It is a small step from the mind's democracy to the state's democracy, and
the multivoicedness or, more generally, "inherent ambiguity" of artistic
expression161 is easily amenable to pluralist reconstruction of such expression
as befitting and welcome in a heterogeneous, perfectly pluralist legal society.
Multiculturalism can be a shifting rhetorical value, given that it has been
deployed with equal force to show Rushdie as the secular Westerner
insensitive to the beliefs of what is a religious minority in England. 162 But
if the Rushdie incident is configured to present the usual censorship issues,'
63
multiculturalism can work in Rushdie's favor. The standard line is that taken
by artist Richard Serra in defense of his own censored sculpture (and Serra
160. Doctorow, supra note 58, at 159; see also Fuentes, supra note 150, at 30, reprinted in THE
RUSHDIE FILE, supra note 6, at 243 ("Fiction is a harbinger of a multipolar and multicultural world ....");
Conference at the Institute of Contemporary Arts in London, supra note 150, at 182 (comments of Maggie
Gee) ("[N]ovels have tended to become popular when... individuals are becoming ... aware of their own
specific identities and beliefs."); cf RuSHDiE, Is Nothing Sacred?, supra note 150, at 420 (pointing to
disparities between novelistic multivoicedness and religious univocalism).
161. See MARJORIE HEINS, SEX, SIN, AND BLASPHEMY: A GUIDE TO AMERICA'S CENSORSHIP WARS
6-7 (1993) ("All censorship contradicts freedom, but... creative expression is inherently ambiguous....
To interpret ... [it] literally and reductively is to miss the point.").
162. See, e.g., S. Res. 72, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REc. S1801 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 1989)
(condemning "state-sponsored terrorism" but recognizing "sensitivity of religious beliefs and practices");
Jimmy Carter, Rushdie's Book Is an Insult, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 1989, at E23; cf. Yasmin Alibhai, Satanic
Betrayals: Is There Anyone Here for Multiculturalism?, NEW STATESMAN & SOc'Y, Feb. 24, 1989, at 12
(discussing both traditionalist and local British pressures leading British Muslims to retain fundamentalist
postures). But see LE MONDE (Paris), Feb. 28, 1989, at 3, reprinted in THE RUSHDIE FILE, supra note 6,
at 134 (quoting Jean-Marie Le Pen of French National Front in his use offatwa as warning for evils of
Muslim immigration to Europe).
163. Cf. Against Immoral Threats, L.A. DAILY J., Feb. 22, 1989, at 6 ("[PIroteeting... [Rushdie] is
to protect artistic expression and intellectual freedom. Those are two hostages that the West cannot allow
militant bigotry to seize."); Martin Garbus, Government Should Protect Booksellers, Publishers, N.Y. U.,
Feb. 28, 1989, at 2; David Kirp, When the Koran and the Constitution Clash, L.A. DAILY J., Apr. 12, 1989,
at 6; Anthony Lewis, How To Answer the Ayatollah's Threat, L.A. DAILY J., Mar. 14, 1989, at 6; A New
Form of Terrorism, L.A. DAILY J., Mar. 2, 1989, at 6 ("Rushdie... has been made an international symbol
of the value of freedom of expression."); Maxine Sonnenburg, Murder Ex Cathedra, L.A. DAILY J., Feb.
22, 1989, at 7; Works of Art Need No Apologies, OBSERVER (London), Feb. 19, 1989, at 14, reprinted in
THE RuSHDIE FILE, supra note 6, at 98, 98 ("It is not the job of the artist to make life more comfortable
for .. . governments. It is the job of democratic governments to protect the artist's right to free
expression ...."). But cf. VLA Perspectives: Lessons from the Rushdie Affair, 13 CoLUM.-VLA J.L. &
ARS 505, 512 (1989) ("'Certainly a black and white censorship issue, but I certainly didn't think it was
a First Amendment issue."' (quoting Bernard Rath)).
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goes on to defend Rushdie as well'6): "The assumption of a universal
standard [for obscenity or decency] is presumptuous. There aren't any
homogeneous standards in a heterogeneous society. There is no univocal voice.
Whose standards are we talking about? Who dictates these standards?"'6'
The apparent law-literature opposition in the Rushdie incident thus seems a
merely contingent one. If only pluralist society could match its own pluralist
ideals, the argument is, there would be minimal legal encroachment on
freedom of literary expression. There is much to be said in favor of this
proposed law-literature union. Where it is actualized, writers and artists do
have a greater degree of psychic and expressive freedom in some sense.
The first problem with this defense of Rushdie, to the extent that it sees
artistic ambiguity legitimating or repeating societal heterogeneity, is con-
ceptual. Bakhtinian literary dialogue and ambiguous artistic expression only
parallel democratic relations between people in a trivial manner, if at all. There
is thus no essential reason why they should be especially fitting in a
democratic state.' 66  Bakhtinian dialogism is not Bruce Ackerman's
"constrained liberal dialogue" 167-interpreting it as such can mean doing
violence to its literary purpose. A certain kind of writerliness cannot be
translated without cost into a certain kind of legalism. Authorial intention may
be too dissipated in a novel to be retrievable at all. If it is retrievable, the
ultimate end of intersubjective dialogue within The Satanic Verses is not to
organize rational power relations between liberal subjects, but, arguably, to
question liberal assumptions about individualism and free, detached
selfhood. 168 There is no reason to think that this kind of novel is an
intellectual mimicry of the multicultural, liberal state, any more than there is
reason to think that liberal dialogue borrows from novelistic literary sensibility.
Even if pluralist principles guarantee toleration of Rushdie's book, the book
itself might be a substantive critique of the basis for liberal selfhood. Carlos
Fuentes and others 169 may defend Rushdie in terms of the novelistic ideal,
but pluralist protection of Rushdie does not have much to do with reading
literature.
Second, to the degree that pluralism is not actualized in modem pluralist
societies, Muslims may be justified in objecting to selective pluralist
164. See Richard Serra, Art and Censorship, 17 CRITICAL INQUIRY 574. 579 (1991).
165. l For other defenses of Rushdie in terms of multiculturalism. see supra note 160.
166. Cf. Letter from Graham Swift, INDEPENDENT (London), Mar. 7. 1989. at 19, reprinted in TIlE
RUSHDIE FILE, supra note 6. at 200, 201 ("A work of literature is more than free expression. it is creative
expression .... ). In addition to being a misinterpretation of creative expression. the pluralistic defense
of Rushdie is no doubt also a misinterpretation of pluralism.
167. See ACKERMAN, supra note 57, at 4-13 (averring constrained dialogue as guiding principle for
liberal dispute resolution and resource allocation).
168. See Slaughter, supra note 14, at 202 ("[Tlhe postmodem like Rushdie denies the essential unity
of both the [Muslim] and the liberal subject.").
169. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
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arguments.' In principle, it is not a blow to the pluralist law-literature
reconciliation to say that pluralism is often not fully effected in pluralist
regimes.71 But the realpolitik lapses exposed by the Rushdie incident show
significant remnants of univocalism in a legal structure that purports to tolerate
multivoiced literature. Most egregiously, the absence of black-letter First
Amendment principles in Britain"' means that statutes and common law
criminalizing blasphemy remain, and more astonishingly, that they continue to
offer official protection to the Christian religion only. 73 By republicizing this
inequity, the Rushdie incident drew direct Muslim protest against British
blasphemy law, t74 occasioned a seminar on English blasphemy law organized
by the Commission for Racial Equality and the Inter-Faith Network of the
United Kingdom, 75 and incited a spate of new works proposing reform
176
and even abolition'" of English blasphemy law.
Third, as the condition of English blasphemy law intimates, secular
regimes, even if they officially relegate religious belief to a private sphere,
may be indebted both historically and ideologically to religion. If pluralist
regimes are not so deracinated from religion as to be innocent of univocal
authoritarianism, some conflict between law and Bakhtinian writerliness is
systemic even in pluralist legal society. The history of American blasphemy
law shows that secular and religious conceptions of social order have been
frequently indistinguishable. 78 A "secular purpose" doctrine allowed early
American courts to avoid the First Amendment and uphold blasphemy laws
170. See, e.g., AKHTAR, supra note 20, at 60 (arguing that freedom is not absolute in democratic
society); Letter from M. Akbar Ali, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Mar. 9, 1989, at 20, reprinted in TihE
RUStDIE FILE, supra note 6, at 199 ("No freedom can be absolute and, in a democratic society, the
individual ... must voluntarily restrain his freedom to stay within the universally accepted bounds of
civilised conduct."); cf. STANLEY FISH, THERE'S No SUCH THING AS FREE SPEECH AND IT'S A GOOD
THING TOO 125 (1994) (arguing that categorical speech/action distinction in American jurisprudence has
hidden less categorical manipulation designed to yield otherwise smart or equitable results). See generally
SIMON LEE, THE COST OF FREE SPEECH 73-105 (1990); Aneta B. Shaparis, Speech, Religious
Discrimination, and Blasphemy, 83 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROc. 427 (1989) (remarks of Hurst Hannum,
Virginia Leary, Ved Nanda, M. Cherif Bassiouni, and W. Michael Reisman).
171. Arguments that liberal procedure is a univocal substantive value and therefore inherently
impermissive of multiculturalism and difference will not be attempted in this Note. For critical legal writing
critiquing form/substance distinctions in liberal philosophy, see ROBEIRTO M. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE &
POLITICS 44-45 (1975).
172. See JOHN SUTHERLAND, OFFENSIVE LITERATURE: DECENSORSHIP IN BRITAIN, 1960-1982, at 13
(1982) (identifying First Amendment to U.S. Constitution as reason for "sharper and clearer" quarrels in
United States than in Britain over literary censorship).
173. See Slaughter, supra note 14, at 183-84; see also supra note 24 and accompanying text.
174. See, e.g., AKHTAR, supra note 20, at 118-23.
175. The resulting monograph is LAW, BLASPHEMY AND THE MULTI-FAITH SOCIErY (Comm'n for
Racial Equality ed., 1990).
176. See, e.g., Sebastian Poulter, Towards Legislative Reform of the Blasphemy and Racial Hatred
Laws, 1991 PUB. L. 371.
177. See, e.g., NICOLAS WALTER, BLASPHEMY: ANCIENT & MODERN (1990).
178. When, before the First Amendment, blasphemy represented a "challenge to the. .. combined
authority of God and the government," it could constitute a capital offense. See WILLIAM NOBIE,
BOOKBANNING IN AMERICA: WHO BANS BOOKS?-AND WHY 196 (1990).
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when they were found necessary to preserve the neutral secular order.'t 9
While this doctrine no doubt enabled politically popular decisions, it also
evinced some actual inability to divorce legal order from religious
authoritarianism. One case made a telling connection between blasphemy law
and "secular" public oath taking."' Later, blasphemy statutes were applied
to cases of garden-variety swearing where obscenity/profanity prosecution
would have been more congenial.' 8' As Harold Berman has written, law
shares with religion the need to ritualistically dramatize social values "to
induce an emotional belief in them as a part of the ultimate meaning of
life.,,
82
Formalistically, a certain piety can continue to color the way in which law
understands authorship and intentionality. Just as earlier American courts often
failed to read ironic double talk as innocent because expressive of authorial
distance,"' current copyright doctrine, in its liberal but uncomfortable
approach to parody, shows what George Marcus calls a "reverent conception
of authorship that treats it as a timeless and natural category of social
identity."' ' Reverence for authorship also means that authorship stands
above community-it cannot be diluted by Bakhtinian interaction with other
voices. Thus, Richard Serra precedes his plea for the appropriateness of
ambiguous artistic expression within a heterogeneous society'" with a
criticism of the Yates Amendment (denying federal money to obscene art)'1
for espousing the very heterogeneous standards he goes on to applaud. Indeed,
this plea for homogeneously applicable (and not multiculturally sensitive) legal
rules is the basis for his defense of Rushdie: "[In the Yates Amendment] [tihe
decision about whether something is obscene is to be made by a local jury,
applying community standards. Does this mean that the material in question
can be tolerated by one community and another community will criminalize its
author? What about Salman Rushdie?"' 87
179. Note, Blasphemy, supra note 153. at 702-06.
180. Id. (citing People v. Ruggles, 8 Johns. 225, 230 (N.Y. 181 I)). "Secular blasphemy" requires more
extended attention than is possible in this Note. Blasphemy is "secular" not just in the sense that prominent
blasphemy prosecutions often have historical/political explanations that eclipse religious explanation. See
Conference at the Institute of Contemporary Arts in London. supra note 150. at 186 (anonymous
comments). It may also be secular in the sense implicit in the deconstructionist polemic that speech.
whether "liberal," "totalitarian," or "religious," is hurtful to its own presumed logos. Cf. Gayatn
Chakravorty Spivak, Reading The Satanic Verses. 2 PUB. CULTURE 79. 82 (1989) ("The question is not
if the book is blasphemous.").
181. Note, Blasphemy, supra note 153. at 695, 719. See generally LEVY. supra note 153. at 527-30.
182. HAROLD J. BERMAN, THE INTERACTION OF LAW AND RELIGION 32-33 (1974).
183. See supra text accompanying note 153.
184. George E. Marcus, The Debate over Parody in Copyright Law: An E.periment in Cultural
Critique, 1 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 295, 296 (1989).
185. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
186. 135 CONG. REc. H6407 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1989) (enacted in Department of the Interior and
Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1990. Pub. L. No. 101-121. § 304(a). 103 Stat. 701. 741 (1989)
(to be codified at 20 U.S.C. § 954)).
187. Serra, supra note 164, at 579. For other, occasionally reluctant. liberal defenses of Rushdie based
on appeal to a univocal moral order, see JEREMY WALDRON, Rushdie and Religion, in LIBERAL RIGHTS:
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Pluralist protection of literature does not correct the disparities between
legal and literary understanding of authorship that the Rushdie incident exposes
elsewhere. In the Rushdie incident, pluralist protection of literature even
demands some evasion of actual reading, since the literature being protected,
if taken too seriously, probably threatens to overtake pluralist ideology. 8
Such literature must be dominated if it is to be protected. The moral of the
story, therefore, is that when a story is protected instead of punished, the
meaning of that story may necessarily have gone equally unheeded." 9
For Muslim sensibility, on the other hand, the Rushdie incident may not
stand for any necessary opposition between law and literature. The Qur'an
itself, as the basis for Islamic law, seems to have both literary and legal status.
Akhtar writes: "The Rushdie affair has proved that, to Muslims, books matter
and that there is a book around [the Qur'an] that can still move
mountains.... [O]ne is afraid of the fellow who writes one book in a life-
time, not the one who writes one every year."'' This unfaltering equation
of legal authority with literature entices an easy analogy with Robert
Ferguson's description of the early American Republic, where law and culture
were unified in purpose, poetic talent was directed toward inculcation of
cultural values, and lawyers were unabashed agents of the state and its
distinctively literary word.' 9 ' It also shows that a law-literature convergence
may not be liberating. An excessive alliance of literature with lawmaking, as
Brook Thomas points out, can easily "raise the specter of censorship."'
92
Robert Weisberg also observes that modem pluralist democracy would not
tolerate, in either artists or statesmen, the moral authority that Ferguson's
vision of the lawyer/lawmaker entails.'93 A "fight for the same territory"'
194
may indeed be better than a truce. The Rushdie incident even seems to show
that the fight is as inevitable as the truce. In Qur'anic law, the legal and the
literary have nonetheless been occupying the same territory all along.
COLLECTED PAPERS 1981-1991, at 134, 135-36 (1993) ("This is the place where ... [liberals] have to
abandon ... relativism .... ); Austin Sarat & Roger Berkowitz, Disorderly Differences: Recognition,
Accommodation, and American Law, 6 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 285, 315 n.142 (1994) ("It is unlikely
that... the vast majority of Western individuals are willing to accept the justness of the fatwa; yet to reject
it requires an assertion of our authority to judge Islamic law."); Arthur Schlesinger, jr, Multiculturalism
and the Bill of Rights, 46 ME. L. REv. 191, 208 (1994) ("Does the fact that The Satanic Verses hurts the
feelings of devout Muslims really justify the murder of Salman Rushdie? Let us not forget Bernard Shaw's
reminder. 'All great truths begin as blasphemies."'); cf ANDREW ALTMAN, CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES: A
LIBERAL CRITIQUE 68-69 (1990) (arguing that liberal philosophy does not threaten objective value).
188. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
189. Cf. Spivak, supra note 180, at 82 ("What is the distinction between punishment and nourishment
[of blasphemy]?").
190. Shabbir Akhtar, Back into the Fold?, AFR. EvENTS (London), Feb. 1991, at 36, 37, reprinted in
SACRILEGE, supra note 40, at 309, 311-12.
191. ROBERT A. FERGUSON, LAW AND LETERS IN AMERICAN CULTURE 25-33 (1984); see also
Weisberg, supra note 3, at 9 (discussing Ferguson).
192. Thomas, supra note 100, at 516-17.
193. Weisberg, supra note 3, at 12.
194. RUSHDIE, Imaginary Homelands, supra note 122, at 14.
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"Occupation" in the hostile sense,195 however, is precisely what is
otherwise distressing about the Rushdie incident, for in it, law and literature
seem to have transgressed jurisdictional boundaries to effect unholy seizures
of foreign territory. A comfortable integration of the two categories cannot
nullify the apparent discomfort each causes the other when demarcating its
own proper province. Exactly where the Rushdie incident leaves law, literature,
or "law and literature" thus remains oddly elusive.1%
195. But cf. EYAL BENVENISTI, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OCCUPATION 3 (1993) ('The law of
occupation developed as part of the law of war. Initially. occupation ... was referred to... as 'belligerent
occupation.' But the history of the twentieth century has shown that occupation is not necessarily the
outcome of actual fighting ... and it... could be the product of a peace agreement.").
196. "For many people," said Rushdie a few years after the fanva. "I've ceased to be a human being.
I've become an issue, a bother, an 'affair."' Rushdie, One Thousand Days in a Balloon. supra note 64. at
16. As an exposition of the Rushdie incident in terms of law and literature, this Note itself risks becoming
another inconsequential abstraction. Yet, what prompted it was the humanity of all who were hurt in the
Rushdie incident, including Rushdie himself. Interpretation, whether literary or legal, usually has an agenda.
and this Note is no different. Relevant normative preferences had best be acknowledged as such, though
anything stated comes with an inevitably richer body of the unstated.
I am and have been a "Rushdie fan." I cannot dismiss the Muslim reaction, though I do not know
whether I would not have dismissed it without the catalytic fatwa. Some of the reactions strike me as
expressions of genuine pain. It is not for me, just as it is not for Rushdie. to prescnbe how people should
make it possible for themselves to live; I do not feel qualified in the least to make that prescription.
Nevertheless, my agenda, as far as I know, was to make visible again a reading expenence that. for me.
felt far from malicious or hurtful--of course. I stand open to correction. There is a sharpness in Rushdie
that can offend, but people do preoccupy him, and when he writes about them. this reader at least has
seldom felt the absence of something very close to tenderness. Perhaps that means he lets people off too
easily.
As an explanatory genre, tragedy no longer comes without internal difficulties, whether one
participates in the tragic design as authorial puppeteer or ignorant puppet. The Satanic Verses is a tragedy
that struggles to emerge, that self-consciously confines its tragic moments, makes fun of them. cuts them
to pieces. It is hard to say after finishing the book that tragedy, however momentarily luminous, has won
over irony. But there is still as much love in the book as there is hate. This is what makes it difficult for
me to forget the Rushdie incident.

